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* Professor of Law, St. Mary’s University School of Law, San Antonio, Texas.  My interest in 
police reform and the use of force stems from my private practice experience representing those 
accused of crime, and from my service as Police Legal Advisor for the Irving, Texas, police department.  
For decades, I have actively participated in law enforcement training in Texas, teaching classes for 
officers, and consulting with police agencies.  These experiences convince me that meaningful reform 
must be undertaken with a thorough understanding of the needs and culture of modern policing, as 
well as a sensitivity to the ways in which abuses of policing affect communities and individuals.  In the 
end, the success of policing is measured by the relationship between law enforcement agencies and the 
people they serve.  The goal is to create an accurate perception that the police act in service of the 
community, and not as a “thin blue line” that divides “us” from “them.”  Law plays an important role 
in defining the boundaries of effective policing, but it is by no means the only limiting force, or even 
the most significant one.  To the extent that it reflects an appropriate police culture rather than 
expressing an unmet aspiration, society will be well served by its law enforcement officers.  In this 
hope, I dedicate this Article to the men and women who serve selflessly in law enforcement, and who 
strive every day to achieve the legitimate ends of sound policing. 
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At the heart of calls for police reform lie use of force laws.  While policing 
agencies adopt and enforce their own policies regarding when and how force 
may be used by officers of those agencies, state laws rarely define the 
uniform limits under which officers operate.1 
Policing in the United States is highly fractured.2  In any county, 
dozens—or even hundreds—of law enforcement agencies may be 
operating.3  Most of these are autonomous.  They determine the policies 
under which they operate, including those for use of force.4  They also 
decide whether and how to investigate violations of internal policies, as well 
as the punishment that will be meted out for policy violations.5  
Predictably, this fragmentation of policing produces inconsistency.  While 
some agencies take seriously the creation of policy, the training of officers 
to comply with that policy, the supervision of officers, and the enforcement 
of internal rules, others neglect policy matters from inception to 
 
1. See Congressional Research Service, Police Use of Force: Overview and Considerations for Congress,  
3 (July 10, 2020), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/LSB10516.pdf [https://perma.cc/53JX-J6TD] 
(introducing “use-of-force policies” at both “federal departments and agencies” level and “local law 
enforcement” level). 
2. See Jill Lapore, The Invention of the Police, NEW YORKER (July 13, 2020), https://www. 
newyorker.com/magazine/2020/07/20/the-invention-of-the-police [https://perma.cc/5BV4-4Y 
PW] (discussing a summary of the development of policing in the United States and the proliferation 
and decentralized growth of law enforcement agencies); see also Seth W. Stoughton, Jeffrey J. Noble, 
Geoffrey P. Alpert, How to Actually Fix America’s Police, ATLANTIC (June 3, 2020), https://www. 
theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/06/how-actually-fix-americas-police/612520/ [https://perma. 
cc/X6PZ-ZJQ2] [hereinafter How to Actually Fix America’s Police] (discussing the “hyperlocalized nature 
of policing in the United States” as a factor in police reform). 
3. See Brian A. Reaves, Local Police Departments, 2013: Personnel, Policies, and Practices, U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice Bureau of Justice Statistics Bulletin 2 (May 2015), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ 
lpd13ppp.pdf [https://perma.cc/3CDT-A6ZM] (reporting in 2013, approximately 15,388 general 
purpose state and local law enforcement agencies existed in the United States). 
4. See Local Police Departments: Policies and Procedures, 2016, U.S. Dep’t of Justice Bureau of Justice 
Statistics 4 (Aug. 2020), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/lpdpp16.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
UYM5-FEWE] (reporting local police departments’ policies, procedures, and compliance).  
5. See Darrel W. Stephens, Police Discipline: A Case for Change, New Perspectives in Policing, 
Washington, D.C.: U.S. Dep’t of Justice, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE (June 2011), https://www.ncjrs. 
gov/pdffiles1/nij/234052.pdf [https://perma.cc/W3AF-TFEM].  
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enforcement.6  The overarching principles that govern all state law 
enforcement agencies in the conduct of their policing function are those 
adopted at the state and federal level. 
The principal limiting norms of police conduct are incorporated in the 
Constitution of the United States, particularly in the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, 
and Fourteenth Amendments.7  But these constitutional constraints, while 
explicated in countless state and federal appellate opinions, remain vague 
contours rather than sharp and bright lines.8  They are suitably broad and 
conceptual, and not specific and prescriptive.  It is important to prohibit 
unreasonable searches and seizures as the Fourth Amendment of the 
Constitution does, but those words only hint at the limits on an officer’s 
conduct.9 
Internal policies, on the other hand, tend to be encompassing and, in 
many cases, quite detailed.10  For example, a departmental policy might 
specify that in the event of an accident in which a vehicle is inoperable due 
to damage, the officer will initiate an impoundment process and will 
inventory the personal effects within the vehicle prior to its being towed 
away.  Standard operating procedures (SOPs) or policy manuals operate like 
an instruction book, prescribing what should or must be done in certain 
specific situations.  
Use of force policies adopted by agencies are sometimes written in 
sweeping terms, but they can be similarly specific.11  Officers may be 
prohibited, for instance, from engaging in any high-speed pursuit, or officers 
may be forbidden from discharging a firearm at a vehicle in which the driver 
is evading apprehension.  Not intended to address all of the situations an 
 
6. See How to Actually Fix America’s Police, supra note 2 (hyperlocalizing policing results in varying 
policies and training in those policies). 
7. See U.S. CONST. amends. IV–VI, XIV (enumerating the freedom from unreasonable searches 
and seizures, the freedom from compelled self-incrimination, the right to assistance of counsel in 
criminal prosecutions, and the right to due process of law).  
8. See How to Actually Fix America’s Police, supra note 2 (finding Fourth Amendment doctrines are 
a “mess,” providing “little meaningful guidance”). 
9. See id. (noting state laws are supposed to be broader than Fourth Amendment constraints). 
10. See id. (“Policy manuals are too lengthy for anyone to realistically expect officers to 
memorize the whole thing . . . .”). 
11. See id. (some use-of-force policies require only the minimum amount of force while others 
are quite specific about varying situations). 
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officer might confront,12 these policies often aim to curb some of the 
foreseeable and undesirable uses of force that might otherwise occur.13  
Despite their best efforts to “pre-judge” the necessity or advisability of 
using force, all law enforcement agencies ultimately rely on the judgment, 
training, and experience of individual officers.  For many, and perhaps for 
most officers, that judgment will be exercised appropriately and use of force 
will be restrained.  But there will, of course, be lapses in judgement, lack of 
training or experience, fear, or implicit or explicit biases that will lead to 
tragic results.14 
In order to further limit the bounds of an officer’s discretion, agencies 
often adopt policies that are more restrictive than constitutional constraints, 
or even state laws, dictate.15  An agency might prohibit the use of deadly 
force except in self-defense or the defense of another, or might require 
officers to use the minimum amount of force necessary to accomplish a 
legitimate policing function.16  State law would likely permit an officer to 
use deadly force in situations not involving self-defense, or to use a greater 
degree of force than is absolutely necessary in some situations.17  But the 
agency is free to adopt a more restrictive policy position. 
State laws governing the use of force, including those of Texas, are 
written in terms of the circumstances in which some level of force is 
justified, the timing of the use of that force, and the quantum of force that 
 
12. The police department for which I worked as a legal advisor had not previously employed 
a lawyer in that position.  In anticipation of my arrival, the chief of the department invited all 
departmental personnel to make a “wish list” of things the department’s new legal advisor should 
address in order to improve law enforcement within the city.  One erstwhile young officer suggested 
that I write a procedure manual detailing all of the situations in which police officers could search 
someone, either with or without a warrant.  I explained to the officer that if I were to be able to create 
such a specific manual, each officer would need to drive a large truck in which to carry the manual, and 
that in any event, the manual would still not address every possible situation that might arise.   
13. See How to Actually Fix America’s Police, supra note 2. 
14. See generally David Brooks, The Culture of Policing is Broken, ATLANTIC (June 16, 2020), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/06/how-police-brutality-gets-made/613030/ 
[https://perma.cc/RFD8-W7B5] (describing various factors contributing to police abuses). 
15. See Federal Power over Local Law Enforcement Reform: Legal Issues, EVERYCRSREPORT 2 
(July 13, 2015–July 7, 2016), https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/R44104.html#_Toc4557580 
66 [https://perma.cc/W9TQ-SLL2] [hereinafter Federal Power] (discussing the U.S. Constitution as a 
“floor” while states can impose greater restrictions). 
16. See, e.g., TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 15.24 (providing officer may not use more force 
than is necessary to secure arrest and detention). 
17. See, e.g., TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 9.32 (deadly force may be used in self-defense when it 
is reasonable to believe it to be immediately necessary); id. § 9.51(c) (officer may use deadly force to 
arrest or prevent escape after arrest in some circumstances). 
4
St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 52 [2021], No. 4, Art. 2
https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol52/iss4/2
  
2021] POLICE USE OF FORCE LAWS IN TEXAS 105 
is justified.18  In short, these laws establish a “ceiling” for an officer’s use 
of force, but not a “floor.”19  And state laws almost always do so, not by 
explicitly delineating what an officer may not do, but rather by describing 
guidelines for what an officer may do.  If the officer acts within those 
boundaries, she has a defense to prosecution based on the use of force.20  
If not, no justification exists. 
Texas’s laws regarding the use of force by the police might be seen as 
consisting of the following categories: criminal statutes;21 justifications 
(defenses) that are available to all persons;22 justifications that apply only to 
peace officers acting in an official capacity;23 and general limitations other 
than justifications on the use of force by peace officers.24  Internal agency 
policies fall outside these statutory norms, although they may reinforce, 
restate, or expand on them.  Policy violations may result in disciplinary 
action—definite or indefinite suspension, reprimand, or demotion in rank—
but not in prosecution.25 
As an example of how law and policy work together, consider the case of 
a police officer who unlawfully shoots and kills a person.  The officer has 
committed a crime.  Whether that crime is best understood as murder, 
manslaughter, criminally negligent homicide, aggravated assault, or some 
other offense depends on the culpability with which the act was done.  But 
the officer may have a defense to prosecution for the crime she has 
committed.  That defense will likely be in the form of a “justification.”  The 
shooting (use of deadly force) might, for example, have been in self-
 
18. See, e.g., id. §§ 9.31–.32, 9.51–.52. 
19. See Federal Power, supra note 15 (stating the U.S. Constitution is a “floor,” and states can 
impose greater restrictions). 
20. See, e.g., PENAL CODE §§ 9.31–.32, 9.51–.52.  
21. See id. ch. 19, 22 (explaining an officer’s actions might constitute criminal activity, usually 
for violating the civil rights of another or for committing a crime against the person, like murder, 
manslaughter, criminally negligent homicide, aggravated assault, or assault). 
22. See, e.g., id. §§ 9.31–.32 (use of non-deadly force in self-defense and use of deadly force in 
self-defense). 
23. See, e.g., id. §§ 9.51–.52 (comparing use of non-deadly or deadly force to arrest or search, or 
to prevent escape after arrest or escape from custody). 
24. See, e.g., TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. arts. 6.06, 15.24; TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. 
§ 24A.003. 
25. See Katherine Hawkins, Unqualified Impunity: When Government Officials Break the Law, They 
Often Get Away with It, POGO (Oct. 22, 2020), https://www.pogo.org/analysis/2020/10/unqualified-
impunity-when-government-officials-break-the-law-they-often-get-away-with-it/ [https://perma.cc/ 
DDR9-RGDC] (illustrating acts of misconduct that do not rise to the level of criminal activity are 
subject to internal discipline, rather than criminal charges). 
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defense26 or defense of another.27  Other defenses may also apply.  For 
instance, the officer may have fired while operating under a reasonable 
mistaken belief about a material fact, thereby negating the officer’s 
culpability for the death.28  Or the officer’s actions may have been 
prompted by the attempted escape of someone who has committed a 
dangerous felony.29  All of this will come into play if the officer is criminally 
prosecuted for the crime. 
Even if our hypothetical officer is not prosecuted under Texas law, a 
prosecution may be mounted under federal law.30  Or the officer may be 
fired or otherwise disciplined for violating an internal policy or rule.  Or the 
officer may be sued for money damages based on a theory of state or federal 
tort liability.31 
This Article does not attempt to address all of the possible consequences 
for an inappropriate use of force by a peace officer.  Rather, it considers 
only Texas state law, and only that law relating to the prosecution of an 
officer for a criminal offense arising from the use of force.  Because policy 
decisions made by individual departments and agencies are not uniform, it 
is not feasible to catalog the myriad ways in which all law enforcement 
entities, even within the state of Texas, limit or allow the use of force.  Tort 
law, the other source of positive law related to harms caused by officers 
using force, generally follows the criminal law in its substance and departs 
primarily in questions regarding immunity and procedure.32  It, too, is not 
directly the subject of this Article. 
 
26. PENAL CODE § 9.32.  
27. Id. § 9.33. 
28. See id. § 8.02 (discussing a “mistake of fact” defense). 
29. See id. § 9.51(c) (justification for use of deadly force to prevent escape in limited 
circumstances). 
30. See 18 U.S.C. § 241 (stating officers may be prosecuted under the theory of “[c]onspiracy 
against rights”).  
31. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (providing federal protection for “every person” deprived of civil 
rights).  
32. See generally John C. Coffee, Jr., Does “Unlawful” Mean “Criminal”?: Reflections on the Disappearing 
Tort/Crime Distinction in American Law, 71 B.U. L. Rev. 193 (1991) (describing the many similarities and 
vanishing differences between criminal law and tort law); Joanna C. Schwartz, Suing Police for  
Abuse is Nearly Impossible.  The Supreme Court Can Fix That., Washington Post (June 3, 2020), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2020/06/03/police-abuse-misconduct-supreme-court-
immunity/ [https://perma.cc/A4HF-6PQQ] (showing how qualified immunity doctrine makes it 
difficult to prevail in police misconduct tort cases). 
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I.    UNDERSTANDING STATUTORY JUSTIFICATION IN TEXAS 
The laws of justification reside in the Texas Penal Code, specifically in 
Chapter 9.33  To say an act is “justified” means in a procedural sense only 
that the person committing the act has a “defense to prosecution.”34  The 
phrase “defense to prosecution,” in turn, establishes the burden assumed by 
the person asserting the justification.35  For all Penal Code crimes, a defense 
to prosecution carries a burden of production, but not a burden of 
persuasion.36 
A burden of production means that the accused need only “produce” 
some evidence that a justification exists.37   
In fact, however, the defendant need not “produce” anything.  Evidence 
suggesting a justification may come from any source in a trial.38  It may 
originate in the testimony of a state’s witness, a defense witness, the 
defendant, or a document.39  If it is “produced” by any of these, the trial 
court is required to instruct the jury on the justification suggested by the 
evidence.40  Moreover, the evidence need not be believable or substantial.41  
It requires very little to raise the possibility of a justification but, once raised, 
the prosecution must disprove the application of that justification beyond a 
 
 
33. PENAL CODE ch. 9. 
34. Id. § 9.02. 
35. See id. § 2.03(d) (“If the issue of the existence of a defense is submitted to the jury, the court 
shall charge that a reasonable doubt on the issue requires that the defendant be acquitted.”). 
36. GERALD S. REAMEY, CRIMINAL OFFENSES AND DEFENSES IN TEXAS 127–28 (Harrison 
Co. 3d ed., 2000). 
37. Id.; see also County of Ulster County, N.Y. v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 158 n.16 (1979) 
(distinguishing “burden of production” from “burden of proof”). 
38. See Hayes v. State, 728 S.W.2d 804, 807 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) (noting it is well settled that 
an accused is entitled to a defensive jury instruction whether the issue is raised by a defendant’s 
testimony alone or otherwise). 
39. See id. (“[A]n accused is entitled to an instruction on every defensive issue raised by 
evidence . . . regardless of whether such evidence is strong or weak, unimpeached or contradicted, and 
regardless of what the trial court may or may not think about the credibility of this evidence.”); see 
Hamel v. State, 916 S.W.2d 491, 493 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (recognizing if a defendant raises a 
defensive issue, he is entitled to a jury instruction regardless of the source or strength of the evidence). 
40. See Hamel, 916 S.W.2d at 493 (stating a witness is entitled to an instruction on defensive 
issues if raised by the evidence); Muniz v. State, 851 S.W.2d 238, 254 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) 
(recognizing if evidence of defensive issue is raised by any party, refusal of trial court to submit to jury 
is abuse of discretion). 
41. See Hamel, 916 S.W.2d at 493 (“[A]n accused has the right to an instruction on any defensive 
issue raised by the evidence, whether that evidence is weak or strong, unimpeached or contradicted, 
and regardless of what the trial court may or may not think about the credibility of the defense.”). 
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reasonable doubt.42  A justification is a powerful shield for the accused.  
Justifications apply to the use of “force” and the use of “deadly force.”43  
Although the Texas Penal Code does not spell out the meaning of “force,” 
“deadly force” is statutorily defined in Chapter 9.44  In effect, when the 
word “force” is used in the chapter, it connotes “non-deadly force,”45 while 
the words “deadly force” indicate force that may result in death or serious 
bodily injury.46  The organizational scheme of the Penal Code chapter 
usually first defines the justification for a use of force, then, in the following 
section, a justification for the use of deadly force.  For example, the use of 
force in self-defense is set forth in Section 9.31,47 followed in 
Section 9.3248 by provisions regarding the justification for the use of deadly 
force in self-defense. 
The practical effect of the justifications in Chapter 9 is to establish 
statutory defenses to crimes in which any level of force is used.  If no 
justification is prescribed, the result is that the accused does not have access 
to such a defense, although other defenses outside of Chapter 9 might be 
 
42. See Mendez v. State, 515 S.W.3d 915, 921 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017), aff’d 
545 S.W.3d 548 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018) (reinforcing once an issue of self-defense is raised by evidence, 
the prosecution must prove elements of offense charged beyond a reasonable doubt, and must prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not act in self-defense); see also REAMEY, supra 
note 36, at 127–28 (discussing defendant has the burden of producing evidence of defense but the 
prosecution retains the burden of persuading the factfinder beyond a reasonable doubt). 
43. See generally TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 9.31–.32 (describing non-deadly and deadly use of 
force in self-defense); id. §§ 9.41, 9.42 (describing non-deadly and deadly use of force in defense of 
property); id. § 9.51 (describing non-deadly and deadly use of force by peace officers conducting a 
search or making an arrest or preventing escape from arrest). 
44. See id. § 9.01(3) (“‘Deadly force’ means force that is intended or known by the actor to cause, 
or in the manner of its use or intended use is capable of causing, death or serious bodily injury.”). 
45. This distinction is not explicit in the Texas Penal Code.  “Force” is not statutorily defined 
for the Code generally, or for Chapter 9 of the Code specifically.  See id. §§ 1.07(a), 9.01 (highlighting 
the lack of any definition for term “force” in both sections).  The connotation is drawn from the 
explicit definition of “deadly force” as “force that is intended or known by the actor to cause, or in the 
manner of its use or intended use is capable of causing, death or serious bodily injury.”  Id. § 9.01(3).  
By process of elimination and deduction from the separation of justifications stemming from “force” 
and “deadly force,” the conclusion is inescapable that “force” was intended to represent “non-deadly 
force.” 
46. Id.  “Death” does not have a Penal Code definition, but “serious bodily injury” does.  See id. 
§ 1.07(a)(46) (“‘Serious bodily injury’ means bodily injury that creates a substantial risk of death or that 
causes death, serious permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of 
any bodily member or organ.”). 
47. Id. § 9.31. 
48. Id. § 9.32(a). 
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available.49  When a Texas peace officer uses any level of force against 
another, and is prosecuted for doing so, the first line of defense will lie in 
Chapter 9.  But those defenses are not exclusive. 
As noted earlier, prosecution is but one of several options available for 
the vindication of a violation of rights.  An officer might be sued, for 
example, for committing a constitutional tort or tort under state law.50  An 
officer also may be subject to agency discipline.  For a variety of reasons, 
internal discipline is almost certainly the most commonly applied 
punishment for misconduct involving the use of force,51 although collective 
bargaining agreements and civil service laws can make even this response 
slow and uncertain.52  
Qualified immunity and indemnification laws or agreements serve to 
protect officers from civil liability for money damages.53  What is left—
prosecution—tends to be the remedy of last resort, which is employed 
 
49. For example, the actor could claim the affirmative defense of insanity.  See generally id. § 8.01 
(“It is an affirmative defense to prosecution that, at the time of the conduct charged, the actor, as a 
result of severe mental disease or defect, did not know that his conduct was wrong.”). 
50. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (proscribing monetary fines and imprisonment for those who 
violate rights while acting under color of law); see also TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 101.021(2) 
(proscribing the Texas Tort Claims Act provision, which waives immunity for injuries caused by 
negligent use of tangible property).  A claim of excessive force by the police is a claim of battery, an 
intentional tort for which the Texas Tort Claims Act confers immunity.  See generally 
Watauga v. Gordon, 434 S.W.2d 586, 594 (Tex. 2014) (“The Texas Tort Claims Act waives 
governmental immunity for certain negligent conduct, but it does not waive immunity for claims arising 
out of intentional torts, such as battery.”). 
51. This is likely to be the case because filing a citizen-initiated complaint against an officer is 
relatively easy and costs nothing.  The sheer number of such complaints, while not reliably reported, 
virtually guarantees that internal discipline occurs more frequently than litigation or prosecution.  While 
internal investigations and internal disciplinary procedures are criticized for being biased and 
ineffective, they must produce more cases of actual discipline, however slight, than other, more formal 
processes.  See Shielded from Justice: Police Accountability and Accountability in the United States, HUM. RTS. 
WATCH (June 1998), https://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports98/police/uspo06.htm [https://perma.cc 
/D79C-CHTU] (describing all options of recourse available to victims of rights violations by an officer, 
including filing an internal complaint). 
52. See Mark Dunphy, SAPD Chief McManus Was Grilled at a Public Safety Hearing.  Here Are 5 
Takeaways, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS (June 20, 2020, 5:13 PM), https://www.mysanantonio. 
com/news/local/article/The-San-Antonio-police-chief-was-grilled-at-a-15352925.php [https://per 
ma.cc/K4RU-TQL6] (reporting 70% of officers fired for misconduct were hired back due to collective 
bargaining- arbitration clauses). 
53. See Amelia Thomson-DeVeaux et al., Why It’s So Rare for Police Officers to Face Legal 
Consequences, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Sept. 23, 2020, 4:53 PM), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/why-
its-still-so-rare-for-police-officers-to-face-legal-consequences-for-misconduct/ [https://perma.cc/9T 
VL-YE6Y] (reporting, since courts have granted qualified immunity to government officials, successful 
lawsuits against police officers are usually unsuccessful unless there is a clear violation of law). 
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infrequently.54  The reasons for this reluctance to prosecute are both 
obvious and numerous, and easily could be the subject of a separate Article.  
For the purposes of this discussion, however, consider prosecution and 
conviction to be a real possibility for an errant peace officer.  Justifications 
and other laws limiting or defining allowable use of force are critical on 
those rare occasions when prosecution is initiated. 
It is a federal crime for a person acting under color of state law to deprive 
a person of a right, privilege, or immunity guaranteed by the Constitution 
or laws of the United States.55  The use of excessive force or unjustified 
force by a peace officer qualifies as the deprivation of a constitutional right, 
usually the right to be free from unreasonable seizure, guaranteed by the 
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.56 
But if prosecution of a peace officer for a state offense is rare; even more 
rare is prosecution of an officer for a use of force that constitutes a federal 
crime.57  Not unlike the principle of complementarity that one finds in the 
procedures of the International Criminal Court,58 federal law enforcement 
agencies are reluctant to investigate officer-involved use-of-force incidents 
in the first instance.  Instead, they defer to their state counterparts to take 
the lead in such investigations and act only when local authorities fail or 
refuse.59 
Similarly, federal prosecutors rarely initiate actions against local 
officers.60  They much prefer to wait for state-level prosecution.  Even if 
 
54. See id. (illustrating the numerous legal hurdles faced in prosecuting police officers for 
violence against civilians).  
55. 18 U.S.C. § 242. 
56. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 388 (1989) (holding claims 
that law enforcement officers used excessive force are “properly analyzed under the 
Fourth Amendment’s ‘objective reasonableness’ standard”). 
57. See Thomson-DeVeaux et al., supra note 53 (reporting the fact that “not all misconduct—
including use of excessive or even fatal force—is illegal” makes prosecution so rare); Asit S. Panwala, 
The Failure of Local and Federal Prosecutors to Curb Police Brutality, 30 Fordham Urb. L.J. 639, 643–44 (2002) 
(noting state prosecutors can use a negligence standard when prosecting excessive force by officers 
whereas district attorneys generally bring charges that require a higher degree of proof). 
58. See generally Informal Expert Paper: The Principle of Complementarity in Practice, ICC-OTP (2003), 
https://www.icc-cpi.int/nr/rdonlyres/20bb4494-70f9-4698-8e30-907f631453ed/281984/compleme 
ntarity.pdf [https://perma.cc/KWT2-T2H5] (highlighting the deference given to States in prosecuting 
international criminals by the International Criminal Court). 
59. See Panwala, supra note 57, at 643 (“The federal government ordinarily defers to local 
authorities in the prosecution of police brutality.”). 
60. See Police Officers Rarely Charged for Excessive Use of Force in Federal Court, TRAC REPORTS 
(June 17, 2020), https://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/crim/615/ [https://perma.cc/B5GU-D4KE] 
(noting federal prosecutors rarely bring charges under 18 U.S.C. § 242). 
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local authorities refuse to prosecute, federal authorities will proceed against 
an officer only if the case is one that has captured strong local or national 
attention and the public demand for prosecution cannot be ignored.61  
Federal criminal prosecution of officers for wrongful use of force remains 
a “backstop” to prevent at least some of the worst cases of injustice. 
As a consequence of this reluctance by federal investigators and 
prosecutors to intervene, the few use-of-force prosecutions of Texas peace 
officers are often for Texas Penal Code offenses.62  Use-of-force 
prosecutions of officers typically involve homicide or assaultive offenses, 
although crimes involving abuse of office may also be appropriate.  For the 
purposes of this Article, the primary focus is on assault and homicide rather 
than offenses punishing malfeasance or misfeasance. 
II.    LAW ENFORCEMENT JUSTIFICATIONS 
Chapter 9 of the Texas Penal Code is populated with general justifications 
applicable to everyone.63  But Subchapter E of the Code sets forth 
justifications exclusively for peace officers.64  To characterize those broadly, 
they apply to the use of force, including deadly force, during an arrest, 
 
61. See United States. v. Koon, 833 F. Supp. 769, 786 (C.D. Cal. 1993), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 
34 F.3d 1416 (9th Cir. 1994) (describing the sequence of state prosecution, acquittal, federal 
prosecution, and conviction of officers involved in the beating of Rodney King). 
62. See Tanya Eiserer, Officer: Dallas Cop on Trial Protected Other Officers When Shot into Car, Killing 
Woman, WFAA NEWS (Feb. 4, 2020, 7:06 PM), https://www.wfaa.com/article/news/crime/dallas-ex-
cop-christopher-hess-goes-on-trial-tuesday/287-92f7fe81-a2e6-4d67-bff2-4efd3f186a20 [https://per 
ma.cc/K38U-Z4XG] (reporting a police officer was prosecuted for aggravated assault); Bobby Allyn, 
Ex-Dallas Officer Who Killed Man in His Own Apartment Is Found Guilty of Murder, NPR (Oct. 1, 2019, 
11:59 AM), https://www.npr.org/2019/10/01/765788338/ex-dallas-officer-who-killed-neighbor-in-
upstairs-apartment-found-guilty-of-murd [https://perma.cc/42WK-DLB7] (covering the story of an 
officer convicted of murder); Nathan Layne, Texas Prosecutor Says Probe of Police Shooting of Black Man Will 
Go to Grand Jury, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Oct. 6, 2020), https://www.usnews.com/news/top-
news/articles/2020-10-06/texas-police-officer-charged-in-killing-of-black-man [https://perma.cc/ 
ZRP6-SN3C] (stating an officer was charged with murder as a result of investigation by Texas Rangers); 
Catherine Dominguez, Former Willis Police Officers Convicted in ‘Drive-By Tasing’ Trial, COURIER (Aug. 14, 
2019, 8:34 PM), https://www.yourconroenews.com/neighborhood/moco/news/article/Former-
Willis-police-officers-convicted-in-14304537.php [https://perma.cc/7NKN-ZVTT] (recounting how 
officers who tased a man running from them were convicted of falsifying documents).  See also Ryser 
v. State, 453 S.W.3d 17, 27 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, pet. ref’d) (reiterating while a peace 
officer’s use of force to effect an arrest may be justified, there are limits to the justifiable use of force). 
63. See generally TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. ch. 9 (providing justifications for use-of-force 
excluding criminal responsibility). 
64. See generally id. ch. 9, sub ch. E (providing specific justifications for use-of-force by law 
enforcement). 
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search, or in preventing escape from custody or after arrest.65  These 
justifications are of particular importance because they extend beyond the 
justifications provided for self-defense, defense of property, and defense of 
others.  In effect, they fill a gap for officer conduct by providing a defense 
for conduct that would be an assault or homicide if committed by anyone 
else. 
As is true for virtually all Chapter 9 justifications, the Texas Penal Code 
uses “magic words” that define and limit the extent to which a justification 
for the use of force by police applies.66  The phrase used repeatedly 
throughout Chapter 9 is “when and to the degree the actor reasonably 
believes the [force or deadly force] is immediately necessary[.]”67  Read 
carefully, this powerful phrasing captures important constraints that prevent 
justifications from applying too broadly.  “When and to the degree” clearly 
connotes both an “if and when” component, and a “degree” or quantum 
component.  This language establishes for every justification in which it 
appears, notice that force may be used only sometimes, and that the degree 
of force used must be modulated by the exigencies of the moment. 
An example of the flexibility inherent in the “when and to the degree” 
formulation may be seen in the following examples.  Suppose that a peace 
officer is threatened by a person with a knife who is standing thirty yards 
from the officer.  A knife may be a deadly weapon, although it is not one 
per se.68  Therefore, the officer could be justified in using deadly force to 
protect herself against the threatened unlawful use of deadly force by the 
person wielding the knife.  But the officer could not simply draw her pistol 
and shoot the would-be attacker.  There is an alternative in this situation 
because it is not yet necessary to use deadly force, even though deadly force 
is involved in the threat.  In other words, “to the degree” might authorize 
that level of force, but the “when” limitation would not permit it while the 
distance between the officer and assailant is so great.  If the knife-wielding 
attacker runs at the officer, closing the distance between them, the level of 
 
65. See generally id. §§ 9.51–.52 (describing the justifications awarded officers in conduct of their 
position). 
66. See, e.g., id. §§ 9.31–.32, 9.41–.42, 9.51–.52 (stating the exact same “magic words” in each 
section). 
67. Examples of this language can be found in TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 9.31–.32, 9.41–.42, 
9.51. 
68. See Thomas v. State, 821 S.W.2d 616, 620 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (stating a knife is not a 
“deadly weapon” per se); see also TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1.07(a)(17)(B) (positing the manner of use 
or intended use determines whether an object is a “deadly weapon”). 
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risk increases until—at some point—it becomes reasonable for the officer 
to believe that the use of deadly force is required.  In a different scenario,  if 
the attacker is threatening to shoot the officer from the same distance, the 
degree of force that might be used to meet that threat is the same as for the 
knife, but the “when” or timing of the use of deadly force changes 
dramatically. 
The simple and obvious point in this example is that the law favors the 
preservation of life; hardly a surprising conclusion.  Is it possible that a person 
could throw a knife at an officer from thirty yards, or thirty feet, and wound 
or kill the officer?  Yes, but the justification provided by law does not 
sanction the use of deadly force to eliminate all risk of harm to the officer.  
Rather, it expects the officer to accept a certain degree of risk in order to 
prevent the much higher risk of death or serious bodily injury were the 
officer to shoot prematurely.  It simply would not be reasonable for the officer 
to believe the use of deadly force is “immediately necessary in this situation.” 
To illustrate the “degree” component of this pivotal phrase, imagine in 
our example that the assailant is unarmed, but threatens to hit the officer 
with his fists.  This threat implicates both the “when” and the “degree” of 
the justification.  An officer should be entitled to use some level of force 
much sooner when threatened with a knife than when threatened with fists, 
but not as soon as would be the case if the officer were threatened with a 
gun.  But the degree of force has also changed in this example (the “degree” 
component).  Ordinarily, being hit with a fist a single time, while potentially 
injurious, does not put one at risk of death or serious bodily injury.  Being 
shot, on the other hand, decidedly does.  So, the officer in the punching 
example does not have to (get to) use any degree of force while the attacker 
is well beyond reach.  It is simply too soon to need to act.  And even when 
the officer does need to act, the officer cannot use force that is 
disproportional to the threat. 
The beauty of this when/degree formulation is that, when properly 
applied, it accounts for all possible variables in a situation.  What if fists are 
the weapons with which the threat is made but the attacker is far stronger, 
much larger, and better trained than the person being threatened?  In that 
case, the degree of force that is justified in self-defense is greater than it 
would be for two combatants who are more evenly matched.  It might even 
be reasonable for a particularly vulnerable person to use deadly force to meet 
the unlawful use of force that does not involve the use of weapons. 
13
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Equally important in the “magic words” employed in Chapter 9 is the 
phrase “reasonably believes.”69  Those words function as a governor on 
both the timing and degree of force.  A peace officer who is trying to place 
a suspect in handcuffs generally has no justification for using deadly force 
against the arrestee who struggles against being restrained.  The officer could 
not “reasonably believe” that “degree” of force was “immediately 
necessary.”  Some lesser degree of force may be justified to overcome the 
level of resistance being offered, but it would not be reasonable to believe 
that no options short of deadly force were available. 
Again, the use of “reasonably believes” in the phrase “when and to the 
degree the actor reasonably believes” provides a flexibility that allows 
justification to exist or not exist according to changing circumstances.  One 
might think of “when and to the degree” as a kind of sliding scale that 
functions on a vertical (“when”) and horizontal (“degree”) axis.  Overlaying 
that scale is the requirement of reasonableness, an objective determination 
that prevents subjective perception from being determinative.70 
The final words that limit the application of Chapter 9 justifications are 
“immediately necessary.”71  These words highlight and reinforce the use of 
“when” which begins the “magic words” phrase.  The clear meaning of this 
additional limitation is that no force should be used unless, and until, it is 
required.72  In this sense, the law prefers both as little force be used as is 
needed to accomplish a legitimate purpose, and that all force be avoided 
until “immediately necessary.”73 
Other statutory mechanisms have been used in the past to promote this 
idea.  For example, for many years Texas imposed a duty to retreat before 
 
69. See, e.g., TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 9.31(a), 9.32(a)(2), 9.33(2), 9.34(a), 9.34(b), 9.41(a), 
9.42(2), 9.43(1), 9.51(a), 9.52–.53 (highlighting the same “magic words” in each section). 
70. See Ryser v. State, 453 S.W.3d 17, 27 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, pet. ref’d) 
(asserting an officer using “more force than is reasonably necessary” to effect an arrest is not justified 
and is subject to criminal prosecution). 
71. See, e.g., PENAL CODE §§ 9.31(a), 9.32(a)(2), 9.33(2), 9.34(a), 9.34(b), 9.41(a), 9.42(2), 9.51(a), 
9.52. 
72. Consider the case of Trammell v. State, in which the defendant had been threatened by his 
victim who had earlier pointed a knife at the defendant.  Because the shooting victim was in his car 
when the defendant shot him, showed no weapon at the time, and because hours had passed since he 
had threatened the shooter with a knife, the appellate court found the evidence insufficient to support 
a finding that the use of deadly force was immediately necessary.  Trammell v. State, 287 S.W.3d 336, 
341 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2009, no pet.). 
73. See REAMEY, supra note 36, at 264 (noting a determination of whether use of force was even 
necessary is left to the finder of fact).  
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using deadly force.74  A retreat requirement functions as an explicit 
limitation on the timing of the use of force, in that it requires a person to 
signal by her actions that she desires to break off any encounter rather than 
stand her ground and fight it out.75  In effect, the retreat rule incorporates 
a “clean hands” requirement for those who would claim the justification of 
self-defense, as does the requirement that a person not provoke the 
encounter that necessitates the use of force.76 
As will be explained in greater detail in Section III(A)(1), infra, Texas 
eliminated the retreat requirement but left the “immediately necessary” 
limitation intact.77  Since this phrase and the other “magic words” apply to 
virtually all of the Chapter 9 justifications, Texans now may not be required 
to retreat, but they are not free to use deadly force unless it is immediately 
necessary to do so.78 
Under certain circumstances, the reasonableness of a person’s belief that 
their use of deadly force is immediately necessary may be presumed.79  But 
the application of this presumption is limited in important ways that also 
will be described infra.  
  
 
74. See Morales v. State, 357 S.W.3d 1, 4–5 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (highlighting the duty to 
retreat that previously existed in Texas law was deleted in 2007). 
75. See generally Beard v. United States, 158 U.S. 550 (1895) (discussing the duty to retreat and 
its rationale). 
76. The equitable principle of “clean hands” is reflected in the duty to retreat as a valuing of 
human life, a moral imperative.  While it is lawful, and perhaps can be seen as moral, to kill or wound 
in self-defense, the retreat rule reinforces the notion that life is of sufficient value that harming or 
killing another must be a last resort, and not a first impulse.  In this sense, the retreat requirement, not 
unlike the denial of self-defense to those who provoke a difficulty, demands that those claiming self-
defense “deserve” its protection. 
77. See Morales, 357 S.W.3d at 4–5 (noting the retreat provision was deleted in 2007); see also 
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 9.32(a)(2) (proscribing a person can use deadly force, in part, “when and 
to the degree the actor reasonably believes the deadly force is immediately necessary”); S.B. 378, 80th 
Leg., R.S. ch. 1, § 3 (codified at TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 9.32(a)) (enacting the new Section 9.32(a) 
language).  A retreat requirement would be reinstated to the Texas self-defense provision for use of 
deadly force if a bill currently pending in the Texas Legislature is enacted.  See H.B. 196, 87th Leg., R.S. 
§ 1 (amending Section 9.32(a) of the Texas Penal Code and taking effect in September 2021 if passed). 
78. See Ryser v. State, 453 S.W.3d 17, 27 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, pet. ref’d) 
(explaining an officer who uses more force than is reasonably necessary to effect an arrest is not 
justified and is subject to criminal prosecution). 
79. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 9.32(b) (outlining the three elements an actor must meet for 
the reasonable presumption that deadly force was immediately necessary). 
15
Reamey: Police Use of Force Laws in Texas
Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2021
  
116 ST. MARY’S LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 52:101 
A. Section 9.51—The Use of Force to Arrest, Search, or Prevent Escape After 
Arrest 
Subject to the usual “magic words,” Section 9.51 of the Texas Penal Code 
creates a justification for peace officers to use non-deadly force in order to 
effect an arrest or conduct a search.80  The officer must reasonably believe 
the arrest or search is lawful in order to be justified in her use of force.81  If 
the search or arrest is made pursuant to a warrant, justification depends on 
the officer’s reasonable belief that the warrant is valid.82  In addition, an 
officer must “manifest[] his purpose to arrest or search and identif[y] himself 
as a peace officer or as one acting at a peace officer’s direction, unless he 
reasonably believes his purpose and identity are already known by or cannot 
reasonably be made known to the person to be arrested.”83 
This language would seem to make the availability of the justification turn 
on a kind of “knock and announce” requirement84 if the arrest or search is 
conducted at a residence, workplace, structure, or in other circumstances 
which would prevent the arrestee or person in charge of the premises to be 
searched from ascertaining visually that the search or arrest is being made 
by a peace officer.  Such announcement requirements may seek to avoid the 
need to use force by affording affected persons the opportunity to submit 
to the officer’s apparent authority. 
Similarly, peace officers are entitled to enter a “house” to make an arrest 
by use of force only “after giving notice of . . . authority and purpose” and 
 
80. See id. § 9.51(a) (“A peace officer . . . is justified in using force against another when and to 
the degree the actor reasonably believes the force is immediately necessary . . . .”).  Section 9.51 would 
be modified in ways that limit its application if currently-pending H.B. 88 is enacted by the Texas 
Legislature.  See Tex. H.B. 88, 87th Leg., R.S. § 20 (2020) (amending Section 9.51 of the Texas Penal 
Code). 
81. See PENAL CODE § 9.51(a)(1) (indicating an officer who is making an arrest or search must 
have the reasonable belief that their actions are lawful). 
82. See id. (clarifying when an officer is executing an arrest or search pursuant to a warrant, they 
must reasonably believe the warrant is legally valid). 
83. See id. § 9.51(a)(2) (detailing the second element which must be met by a peace officer before 
using force against another). 
84. The “knock and announce” rule requires officers executing a search or arrest warrant to 
announce themselves and their purpose before forcibly entering premises.  Such a requirement is part 
of the Fourth Amendment, as well as Texas criminal procedure law.  U.S. CONST. amend. IV; Wilson 
v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 930 (1995) (holding the “knock and announce principle forms a part of the 
Fourth Amendment reasonableness inquiry”); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 15.25–.26. 
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being refused admittance.85  Moreover, an officer who is making an arrest 
under authority of a warrant must announce that fact in all cases.86  
1. The Contradiction of Article 15.24 and Other “Minimum-Force” 
Approaches 
The Texas Code of Criminal Procedure contains the following provision 
regarding use of force to effect an arrest: 
In making an arrest, all reasonable means are permitted to be used to effect it. 
No greater force, however, shall be resorted to than is necessary to secure the 
arrest and detention of the accused.87 
This peculiar statute authorizes “all reasonable means” to effect an arrest, 
presumably including the use of whatever level of force is “reasonable,” 
while it simultaneously limits the use of force to the minimum necessary to 
accomplish the purpose.  Further, the first sentence of the Article clearly 
applies to “arrest,” but the second sentence requiring minimum force 
applies to “arrest and detention.”88 
Force which is reasonable may well exceed what is necessary.  To the 
extent that an officer’s actions fall within that gap, is their conduct to be 
judged by a reasonableness standard or by the limitation to use no greater 
force than is required?  Whatever the answer, it is unclear that the Code of 
Criminal Procedure language has any practical impact on a criminal 
prosecution. 
Assuming an officer is prosecuted for aggravated assault for causing an 
arrestee serious bodily injury, could the defendant officer use the language 
of the Criminal Procedure Code to argue that, as long as their use of force 
was reasonable, it was justified?  Or, could the prosecution counter any claim 
of reasonableness by pointing to the language requiring minimum force? 
 
85. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 15.25 (clarifying the notice requirements to break 
down a door of a house are subject to felony cases). 
86. See id. art. 15.26 (instructing peace officers to always inform the accused of the authority in 
which the arrest is legally made pursuant to a valid warrant). 
87. See id. art. 15.24 (emphasizing the specific procedure on when officers may use force during 
an arrest of a suspect). 
88. “Detention” is a term of constitutional art describing a temporary investigative seizure of a 
person based on less than the probable cause required for the more intrusive “arrest.”  Barnes v. State, 
870 S.W.2d 74, 78 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1993) (citing United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 
U.S. 873, 881–82 (1975)) (“[A] temporary detention represents a lesser intrusion on an individual's 
security and integrity than a formal arrest . . . .”). 
17
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Article 15.24 creates neither an offense nor a justification.  The controlling 
defensive language lies in Chapter 9 of the Texas Penal Code, which, by its 
terms, establishes and defines a justification for the use of force (or deadly 
force) in making an arrest.89  The assaultive crime with which the officer is 
charged is created in Chapter 22 of the Penal Code.90  The role of 
Article 15.24, which is a criminal procedure provision, is ambiguous.  It may 
be no more than hortatory, without legal effect.  Or it may be found to 
establish a standard—albeit an internally contradictory one—by which an 
officer’s conduct will be judged in a tort action or a disciplinary hearing for 
excessive use of force. 
Ultimately, the reasonableness requirement found in Section 9.51 will be 
the standard that counts in any prosecution.  A jury instruction that the 
officer was not allowed to use more force than necessary to effect the arrest 
would undermine the defense created in Chapter 9.91  This contradiction 
turns out to be an important one—not so much in current practice but in 
contemporary discussion of best practices in policing.  If the minimum-
force standard is favored to deter abusive arrests by the police, any 
justification or defensive issue that exists within Texas law must be entirely 
consistent with that standard. 
The minimum-force language found in Article 15.24 of the Texas 
Criminal Procedure Code expresses a standard receiving attention as law 
enforcement agencies and others focus on reform prompted by publicized 
uses of violence by the police.  One important expression of this standard 
is found in the American Law Institute’s Principles of the Law, Policing 
(Principles).92  This project of the Institute (ALI) has been ongoing since 
2015, but the first component to be approved by the membership of ALI is 
Chapter 5 on the use of force.93  Principles adopted by the ALI do not seek, 
 
89. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 9.51 (“A peace officer . . . is justified in using force against 
another when and to the degree the actor reasonably believes the force is immediately necessary . . . .”). 
90. See id. § 22.02 (including peace officers in the pool of potential offenders for assault charges). 
91. See Ryser v. State, 453 S.W.3d 17, 27 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, pet. ref’d) 
(explaining “an officer us[ing] more force than is reasonably necessary [has] exceed[ed] [their] statutory 
authority and may be subject to criminal liability”) (emphasis added).  To instruct a jury that an officer 
using reasonable force to arrest may be criminally responsible because the officer used more than the 
minimum degree of force necessary to arrest would nullify the justification in Section 9.51, substituting 
a more stringent standard for the justification than the one established expressly in Chapter 9. 
92. See generally PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF POLICING (Am. L. Inst., Revised Tentative Draft 
No. 1, 2017) (recommending criminal law rules to governmental agencies and private citizens) 
[hereinafter POLICING]. 
93. See id. at 1–25 (providing a comprehensive list of how the use of force ought to be practiced 
in a criminal law setting). 
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as do the ALI’s restatements of the law or model codes, to reflect what the 
law is or how it should be formulated.94  Rather, principles state what might 
be called “best practices.”95  These statements of preferred practice may be 
adopted by legislatures, administrative rule-making bodies, or law 
enforcement agencies formulating internal policy.96 
The overarching principle of the ALI’s work on police use of force is 
stated in Section 5.03: 
§ 5.03. Minimum Force Necessary 
In instances in which force is used, officers should use the minimum force 
necessary to perform their duties safely.  Agencies should promote this goal 
through written policies, training, supervision, and reporting and review of 
use-of-force incidents.97 
“Force,” as that term in used in the Principles, encompasses physical contact 
ranging from light touching to, what in Texas law would be deadly force.98  
It is made clear at the outset that force should only be employed for certain 
legitimate policing objectives: 
§ 5.02. Objectives of the Use of Force 
Officers should use physical force only for the purpose of effecting a lawful 
seizure (including an arrest or detention), carrying out a lawful search, 
preventing imminent physical harm to themselves or others, or preventing 
property damage or loss.  Agencies should promote this objective through 
written policies, training, supervision, and reporting and review of use-of-
force incidents.99 
 
94. See id. at xii (“[I]t is essential that the commentary make clear the extent to which the black-
letter principles correspond to actual law and, if not, how they might most effectively be implemented 
as such.”). 
95. See id. (notating the purpose of the recommendations outlined in ALI’s “Principles”). 
96. See id. at xv (affirming the audience for the project is broad and includes legislatures, policing 
agencies, regulatory bodies, the public, and the courts). 
97. Id. § 5.03 (explaining when minimum force should be used to perform the job duties in a 
safe and necessary manner).  A bill introduced in the 87th Regular Session of the Texas Legislature 
would limit the justification for use of force to arrest in ways that at least approach the “minimum 
force” standard without expressly requiring that no more than minimal force be used.  See Tex. H.B. 88, 
87th Leg., R.S. § 20 (2020) (amending Section 9.51 of the Texas Penal Code). 
98. See id. § 5.02, cmt. a (defining the term “force”). 
99. Id. § 5.02 (detailing when an officer should use force when making an arrest or search). 
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The principle that minimum force should be used is reinforced, and even 
extended, by a stated principle that effort should be made to de-escalate 
confrontations in order to avoid the use of force altogether: 
§ 5.04. De-escalation and Force Avoidance 
Agencies should require, through written policy, that officers actively seek to 
avoid using force whenever possible and appropriate by employing techniques 
such as de-escalation.  Agencies should reinforce this Principle through 
written policies, training, supervision, and reporting and review of use-of-
force incidents.100 
This position, coupled with the general admonition that no more force 
should be used than is necessary, contrasts with Texas Penal Code 
Section 9.51, which justifies the use of force an officer reasonably believes 
to be immediately necessary in effecting an arrest or making a search.101  In 
Texas, an officer may use non-deadly force to arrest or search in situations 
where force may be unnecessary, as long as the officer has a reasonable 
belief that it was necessary.  Moreover, the officer need not attempt to de-
escalate the threat of force or “avoid using force whenever possible and 
appropriate.”102  
In taking this approach, Texas green lights the use of force if it is 
reasonable in degree and the officer reasonably believes it is immediately 
necessary.103  An officer could claim their actions were justified even if less 
 
100. Id. § 5.04. 
101. The “minimum force” position is consistent, however, with at least the second sentence 
of Article 15.24 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, a provision that does not create an offense 
for the use of force that exceeds the minimum necessary.  TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 15.24.  
102. Principles of Law: Use of Force, POLICING PROJECT, https://www.policingproject.org/ali-
use-of-force [https://perma.cc/2TDX-VKTA].  Texas law currently contains no requirement that an 
officer attempt to de-escalate a situation to avoid the use of force.  Individual agencies in Texas 
sometimes do require officers to use de-escalation techniques.  See, e.g., CITY OF SAN ANTONIO POLICE 
DEP’T, GENERAL MANUAL § 501.05(F) (2020) (requiring officers to de-escalate quantum of force 
when reasonable, and to attempt to avoid use of force by de-escalation).  A bill titled the “George 
Floyd Act” was filed by Rep. Senfronia Thompson in the 87th session of the Texas Legislature that 
would have added to the criminal procedure code a provision requiring de-escalation.  See Tex. 
H.B. 833, 87th Leg., R.S. (2020) (adding Article 2.33 to Texas Code of Criminal Procedure).  Had it 
been enacted, the enforcement of this provision would almost certainly have faced challenges based 
on vagueness, as well as the uncertainty of the legal effect of a provision in the criminal procedure code 
that creates no crime, but only requires individual agencies to create policies establishing de-escalation 
requirements.  The bill, an ambitious attempt at police reform, eventually died in committee. 
103. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 9.51 (instructing when exactly an officer of the law can use 
force against another individual in which the force will be legally justified). 
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force, or no force at all, might have sufficed.  And the officer’s claimed 
justification would not be defeated by their lack of effort to avoid force. 
2. The Further Contradiction of Articles 6.06 and 6.07 
In addition to Article 15.24, the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure 
speaks to the degree of force to be used in specific circumstances in other 
provisions.104  Article 6.06 creates a general legal duty for peace officers to 
prevent any offense against the person or property of another that is 
committed in their presence or view.105  In the course of this required 
intervention, “[t]he peace officer must use the amount of force necessary to 
prevent the commission of the offense, and no greater.”106  
This limiting language, not unlike that found in Article 15.24, seemingly 
restricts the use of force to the minimum necessary.  Article 6.07 of the 
Texas Criminal Procedure Code, the provision immediately following 
Article 6.06’s limitation on force, immediately contradicts the preceding 
statute by giving peace officers engaged in the prevention of offenses about 
to be committed in their presence or view the right to “use all force 
necessary.”107  While not plainly stated, the statute seems intended to apply 
to protect persons from harm. 
As with Article 15.24, it is difficult to know what practical effect this 
statutory language has upon a prosecution of a peace officer for using 
excessive force.  An officer who reads these various Texas use of force 
provisions carefully would find the following legislative instructions on the 
degree of force that may be used: 
1. A peace officer may use “all reasonable means” to make an arrest;108 
2. A peace officer may use “[n]o greater force . . . than is necessary to 
secure the arrest and detention of the accused;”109 
 
104. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 6.06–.07 (explaining an officer may use necessary 
force to prevent a crime from occurring but cannot exceed their authority when using said force). 
105. See id. art. 6.06 (“Whenever, in the presence of a peace officer, or within his view, one 
person is about to commit an offense against the person or property of another, including the person 
or property of his spouse, or injure himself, it is his duty to prevent it . . . .”). 
106. Id. (emphasis added). 
107. Id. art. 6.07 (emphasis added) (“[Peace officers] may use all force necessary to repel the 
aggression.”). 
108. See id. art. 15.24 (“In making an arrest, all reasonable means are permitted to be used to 
effect it.”). 
109. See id. (detailing the degree of force to which an officer can use when making an arrest). 
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3. A peace officer must act to prevent an offense against a person or 
property that is about to occur in his or her presence or view by the 
use of “no greater” force than is necessary to prevent the offense;110 
4. A peace officer acting to prevent an offense against a person that is 
about to occur in his or her presence or view may “use all force 
necessary” to prevent harm to the person;111 
5. A peace officer is justified (has a defense to prosecution) in using the 
degree of non-deadly force she reasonably believes is immediately 
necessary to effect an arrest or conduct a search;112 but 
6. A peace officer is only justified in using deadly force to arrest when 
the officer reasonably believes the deadly force is immediately 
necessary and the officer “reasonably believes the conduct for which 
arrest is authorized included the use or attempted use of deadly force; 
or [the officer] reasonably believes there is a substantial risk that the 
person to be arrested will cause death or serious bodily injury to the 
[officer] or another if the arrest is delayed.”113 
If accountability for abusive use of force is what matters most and if there 
is a realistic possibility that accountability will be sought through criminal 
prosecution, the justifications found in Chapter 9 are the defenses that have 
the potential to exonerate an officer who uses excessive or unlawful force.  
In other words, the legislative admonition to use no greater force than 
necessary in arresting a suspect is of no practical consequence.  A reasonable 
belief that the force used by the officer was immediately necessary will save 
the defendant from criminal responsibility, even if a lesser degree of force 
would have been effective under the circumstances. 
B. Justifications for the Use of Deadly Force in Policing Texas 
Section 9.51 of the Texas Penal Code also provides a limited justification 
for the use of deadly force to arrest or prevent escape after arrest.  Not so 
 
110. See id. art. 6.06 (“The peace officer must use the amount of force necessary to prevent the 
commission of the offense, and no greater.”). 
111. See id. art. 6.07 (“[Peace officers] may use all force necessary to repel the aggression.”). 
112. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 9.51(a) (“A peace officer . . . is justified in using force 
against another when and to the degree the actor reasonably believes the force is immediately 
necessary . . . .”). 
113. See id. § 9.51(c) (outlining when an officer can legally use deadly force in making an arrest 
or search). 
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many years ago, police officers routinely were authorized to use deadly force 
to apprehend fleeing felons.114  Even without knowing more about the 
contours of this rule, the “fleeing felon” rule was facially problematic. 
Whereas felonies once carried the connotation of very serious criminality 
punished in the harshest ways, including by death,115 the proliferation of 
crimes denominated as felonies have created offenses that are not violent or 
dangerous or even particularly harmful to property.  Only one capital felony 
exists in Texas, so the notion that all or most felonies carry the death penalty 
is simply wrong.  Without further consideration, it is obvious that the use of 
deadly force to apprehend perpetrators of non-violent crimes is 
excessive.116  Even for the most serious felonies, an officer who kills a 
suspect to apprehend them or prevent their escape has, as an agent of the 
state, executed a person who has not been tried, convicted, or sentenced.117  
In 1985, the Supreme Court of the United States rejected the categorical 
use of deadly force to arrest a fleeing felon.118  Prior to that decision in 
Tennessee v. Garner,119 Texas had already abandoned the “fleeing felon” rule 
in favor of the later adopted approach in Garner.120  Section 9.51 of the 
Texas Penal Code creates a justification for the use of deadly force to make 
an arrest, or to prevent escape after arrest, if the use of non-deadly force 
would have been justified, and either the crime for which the arrest is being 
made involved the use or attempted use of deadly force, or the officer 
reasonably believed that the person to be arrested would cause death or 
serious bodily injury if the arrest was delayed.121 
 
114. See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 12–13 (1985) (detailing the history of an officer’s 
decision to use force under the Fourth Amendment). 
115. See id. at 13–14 (referencing how all felonies were once punishable by death, while today 
almost all are not). 
116. See id. at 11 (“Where the suspect poses no immediate threat to the officer and no threat to 
others, the harm resulting from failing to apprehend him does not justify the use of deadly force to do 
so.”). 
117. Cf. id. at 10 (“The use of deadly force is a self-defeating way of apprehending a suspect and 
so setting the criminal justice mechanism in motion.  If successful, it guarantees that . . . mechanism 
will not be set in motion.”). 
118. See id. at 11 (holding “the use of deadly force to [apprehend] . . . all felony suspects, 
whatever the circumstances, is constitutionally unreasonable”). 
119. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985). 
120. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held, long before the adoption of the current penal 
code provision, that a peace officer is not warranted in killing a person who is resisting arrest or fleeing 
from the officer unless the killing is done in self-defense.  Grohoske v. State, 61 S.W.2d 847, 848 (Tex. 
Crim. App. 1933). 
121. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § art. 9.51(c); see also Garner, 471 U.S. at 11–12 (holding a 
Tennessee statute which permits officers to use deadly force to against suspects, who may threaten the 
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The justification in Section 9.51 overlaps to some extent with that found 
in Section 9.52 of the Texas Penal Code.  While Section 9.51 applies to the 
use of deadly force “to make an arrest, or to prevent escape after arrest,”122 
Section 9.52 pertains to force used “to prevent the escape of an arrested 
person from custody.”123  The language used in these two statutory 
provisions may have been intended to distinguish between the status of a 
person who has been arrested but not yet placed in “custody,” and a person 
who is incarcerated or otherwise in a custodial setting.  If so, the distinction 
is undefined and unclear. 
A person who has been arrested is “seized” for purposes of the Fourth 
Amendment and is said to have been taken into “custody.”124  All 
incarcerated persons have been arrested, so the Section 9.51 justification for 
use of force or deadly force to prevent escape applies.  Also applicable are 
the limitations on the use of deadly force mandated by Tennessee v. Garner.125  
Section 9.52 of the Penal Code (“Prevention of Escape from Custody”) 
provides: 
The use of force to prevent the escape of an arrested person from custody is 
justifiable when the force could have been employed to effect the arrest under 
which the person is in custody, except that a guard employed by a correctional 
facility or a peace officer is justified in using any force, including deadly force, 
that he reasonably believes to be immediately necessary to prevent the escape 
of a person from the correctional facility.126 
This statute is rife with contradictions of state and constitutional standards.  
Most obvious is the abandonment of the usual limitations imposed on 
justifications in Texas law, including the “when and to the degree” 
 
officer or others with serious bodily injury, passed constitutional muster); Kacz v. State, 287 S.W.3d 
497, 504–07 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, no pet.) (holding the officer’s belief that a fleeing 
suspect would cause serious bodily injury or death to another if allowed to escape was not reasonable). 
122. PENAL CODE § 9.51(c). 
123. Id. § 9.52. 
124. See California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 624 (1991) (reaffirming the Fourth Amendment’s 
protection against unreasonable seizures includes seizure of the person and the mere application of 
physical force to a suspect is sufficient to constitute an arrest); Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260, 266 
(1973) (holding the suspect was “arrested” for the purpose of taking him into “custody”).  
125. See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11–12 (1985) (holding that not all applications of 
deadly force to apprehend a fleeing felon are facially unconstitutional). 
126. PENAL CODE § 9.52. 
24
St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 52 [2021], No. 4, Art. 2
https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol52/iss4/2
  
2021] POLICE USE OF FORCE LAWS IN TEXAS 125 
language.127  While Section 9.51 allows the use of non-deadly force only to 
the degree an officer reasonably believes it to be immediately necessary to 
prevent escape after arrest,128 and much more strictly limits the use of 
deadly force for that purpose,129 once a person is in “custody”130 in a 
“correctional facility,”131 that same officer is free of the constraints that 
would have applied to the use of deadly force while the arrestee was in 
custody (under arrest).132  
The most striking and serious problem with Section 9.52, of course, is 
that it violates the constitutional norms explicated in Tennessee v. Garner.133  
The clear language of the statute permits a correctional officer or peace 
officer to use deadly force if, for example, the officer reasonably believes 
she will not be able to apprehend an escapee otherwise.134  No regard is 
paid to whether the person escaping has been convicted of a crime, whether 
any alleged crime involved violence, or whether the escapee poses a danger 
to others if apprehension is delayed.135  In short, the justification afforded 
by Section 9.52, like the discredited “fleeing felon” rule, sweeps too broadly.  
In doing so, it runs afoul of the U.S. Constitution.  No reported case in 
Texas has addressed this concern, presumably because none has been 
decided since Tennessee v. Garner. 
 
127. Sections of Chapter 9 of the Texas Penal Code justifying force in self-defense, defense of 
others, defense of property, and in making an arrest or conducting a search include the “when and to 
the degree” limitation.  See, e.g., id. §§ 9.31–.32, 9.41–.42, 9.51 (applying the limitation of “when and to 
the degree” to certain instances of when force is justified against others). 
128. See id. § 9.51(a) (“A peace officer . . . is justified in using force against another when and to 
the degree the [officer] reasonably believes the force is immediately necessary to make or assist in 
making an arrest or search, or to prevent or assist in preventing escape after arrest . . . .”). 
129. See id. § 9.51(c)(1) (“[I]f the use of force would have been justified under Subsection (a) 
and: (1) the actor reasonably believes the conduct . . . included the use . . . of deadly force . . . .”). 
130. “Custody means [to be] under arrest by a peace officer[,] . . . under restraint” pursuant to 
a court order, “or under restraint by an agent or employee of a [contract confinement] facility.” Id. 
§ 38.01(1)(A–B); see also id. § 9.01(1) (designating the statutory definition of “custody”).  
131. A “correctional facility” is “a place designated by law for the confinement of a person 
arrested for, charged with, or convicted of a criminal offense.”  See id. § 1.07(a)(14) (defining the term 
“correctional facility” by statute). 
132. See id. § 9.52 (detailing when an officer or a correctional guard is justified in using deadly 
force against a prisoner who is in custody). 
133. See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11–12 (1985) (“The use of deadly force to prevent 
the escape of all felony suspects, whatever the circumstances, is constitutionally unreasonable.”). 
134. See PENAL CODE § 9.52 (providing for when deadly force is justified by a correctional 
officer to use against an escapee). 
135. The statutory definition of “correctional facility” includes “a place . . . for the confinement 
of person[s] arrested for, charged with, or convicted of a criminal offense.”  Id. § 1.07(a)(14). 
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Section 9.52 also is inconsistent with Section 5.05 of the American Law 
Institute’s (ALI) Principles of the Law, Policing.136  A portion of that principle 
provides that, “deadly force should not be used except in response to an 
immediate threat of serious physical harm or death to officers, or a 
significant threat of serious physical harm or death to others . . . .”137  This 
best practice standard would not allow the use of “any force, including 
deadly force” to prevent escape from a correctional facility.  The use of 
deadly force is reserved in principle 5.05 for self-defense or defense of 
others, and Texas law provides justifications for those usages in statutes 
independent of Section 9.52.138 
Policy-wise, it is difficult to fathom why this extraordinary grant of 
authority to use deadly force to prevent escape from custody should be 
justified.  In Texas, “correctional facilities” include municipal and county 
jails.139  These jails typically house misdemeanants and persons awaiting 
trial, some of whom have not been formally charged by information or 
indictment.140  Granted, the jail population also includes persons convicted 
of crime and serving sentences, as well as prisoners who have felony 
convictions and are waiting to be transferred to state prisons.141  The 
problem with Section 9.52 is that it makes no attempt to differentiate 
between felons and misdemeanants or the convicted and the merely 
suspected.  It treats all prisoners as sufficiently dangerous to merit the use 
of deadly force in their apprehension, without regard for the nature of the 
crime for which the prisoners are being held.  If, for instance, an out-of-
shape, slow-moving deputy were to see a prisoner in a city jail who had been 
taken into custody for public intoxication running from the jail, the deputy 
might reasonably conclude that it was immediately necessary to shoot the 
fleeing prisoner in order to prevent his escape because the deputy could not 
 
136. See POLICING, supra note 92, at § 5.05 (limiting the situations in which an officer may be 
justified in using deadly force). 
137. See id. (creating a limited exception of when officers may use deadly force against a suspect). 
138. See PENAL CODE § 9.42 (providing for use of deadly force in defense of property); Id. 
§ 9.51(c) (providing for use of deadly force to arrest or apprehend). 
139. Id. § 1.07(a)(14)(A). 
140. See Richard M. Aborn & Ashley D. Cannon, Prisons: In Jail, but Not Sentenced, AMERICAS Q. 
(Jan. 16, 2013), https://www.americasquarterly.org/fulltextarticle/prisons-in-jail-but-not-sentenced/ 
[https://perma.cc/Q48C-VJXB] (“Each year, millions of people across the world find themselves in 
jail without being convicted of anything—often for months at a time—as they await trial.”). 
141. See Yami Virgin, Hundreds of Inmates Waiting for Prison, Facility Transfer Costing You $60 a Day, 
Each, FOX 29 NEWS (May 26, 2020), https://foxsanantonio.com/news/yami-investigates/hundreds-
wait-to-go-to-a-state-prison-or-treatment-facility [https://perma.cc/Y9WM-HR62] (reporting the 
number of Bexar County inmates and how this affects local taxpayer money). 
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apprehend him otherwise.  The literal language of Section 9.52 would justify 
that deputy’s actions. 
III.    JUSTIFICATIONS FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT AND CIVILIAN 
USE OF FORCE 
Justifications for the use of force by law enforcement officers comprise a 
relatively small part of the justification universe in Texas.142  Chapter 9 of 
the Texas Penal Code includes justifications for necessity,143 public 
duty,144 self-defense,145 defense of others,146 defense of property,147 and 
assorted other provisions related to justification.148  In addition to the 
justifications for use of force to arrest, search, or prevent escape, Texas 
peace officers may avail themselves of any of the other justifications 
described in Chapter 9. 
Circumstances dictate which one, or ones, of these defenses will be 
available and effective in defending against a prosecution for wrongful use 
of force by the police.  Often, more than one of the justifications shields the 
officer from criminal responsibility.  For example, if an officer discovers 
during a traffic stop that a felony arrest warrant is outstanding for the 
detained motorist, the officer will initiate an arrest procedure, often without 
 
142. Justification exists in Texas for public duty, necessity, self-defense, defense of third person, 
defense of one’s own property, defense of third person’s property, and for other uses of force unrelated 
to law enforcement.  See generally PENAL CODE ch. 9 (outlining the circumstances of when a force is 
legally justified). 
143. See id. § 9.22(1) (“Conduct is justified if . . . the actor reasonably believes the conduct is 
immediately necessary to avoid imminent harm . . . .”). 
144. See id. § 9.21(a) (“[C]onduct is justified if the actor reasonably believes the conduct is 
required or authorized by law, by the judgment or order of a competent court or other governmental 
tribunal, or in the execution of legal process.”). 
145. See id. § 9.31(a) (“[A] person is justified in using force against another when and to the 
degree the actor reasonably believes the force is immediately necessary to protect the actor against the 
other’s use or attempted use of unlawful force.”). 
146. See id. § 9.33 (“A person is justified in using force or deadly force against another to protect 
a third person . . . .”). 
147. See id. § 9.41(a) (“A person in lawful possession of land or tangible, movable property is 
justified in using force against another when and to the degree the actor reasonably believes the force 
is immediately necessary to prevent or terminate the other’s trespass on the land or unlawful 
interference with the property.”). 
148. See id. § 9.61 (parent-child) (providing for when a parent is justified in using force against 
their own child); id. § 9.62 (educator-student) (creating a justification for educators who may be 
required to use force against a student); id. § 9.63 (guardian-incompetent) (providing a justification for 
guardians who may need to use force against an incompetent individual). 
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announcing their purpose immediately.149  After the officer has ordered the 
motorist out of the vehicle, the officer will give a series of commands 
designed to ensure the officer’s safety.150  Should the wanted motorist reach 
into a pocket or otherwise move furtively in a way that is contrary to the 
officer’s commands, the officer may form a belief that the motorist has a 
weapon that threatens the officer.  Officers have been known to shoot in 
such situations, or use lesser degrees of force, later claiming that their belief 
that the motorist was about to use deadly force warranted a reasonable belief 
that the officer’s use of force was necessary.151 
Setting aside important questions about the reasonableness of the 
officer’s actions in this hypothetical situation, if the officer is prosecuted for 
assault, aggravated assault, manslaughter, or murder, the defense might 
suggest through trial evidence that the officer’s actions were justified by 
Penal Code Section 9.51(a) (use of non-deadly force to arrest),152 
Section 9.51(c) (use of deadly force to arrest),153 or Sections 9.31154 and 
9.32155 (use of non-deadly or deadly force in self-defense).  If another 
 
149. An officer need not declare a suspect to be under arrest for the seizure to constitute an 
arrest for Fourth Amendment purposes.  See Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 212–13 (1979) 
(holding the suspect who was involuntarily transported to police station for questioning without being 
told he was under arrest was nevertheless arrested for Fourth Amendment purposes). 
150. See Reid J. Schar. What Constitutes a “Lawful Order”, HILL (Sept. 17, 2015), https://thehill. 
com/blogs/congress-blog/judicial/253939-what-constitutes-a-lawful-order [https://perma.cc/3E 
9G-3F6B] (suggesting the purpose of an officer’s orders during a traffic stop is ensuring safety). 
151. See Battle Creek Police Officer Shoots Passenger During a Traffic Stop, WWMT CHANNEL 3 NEWS 
(Oct. 20, 2020), https://wwmt.com/news/local/battle-creek-police-officer-shoots-passenger-during-
a-traffic-stop [https://perma.cc/NU7N-SF7L] (reporting a passenger reached for gun on floor of 
vehicle during a traffic stop and was shot by officer); Aaron Martinez, Man Shot by Officer During Traffic 
Stop Faces Charges, EL PASO TIMES (Apr. 20, 2017), https://www.elpasotimes.com/story/news/ 
crime/2017/04/20/drugs-gun-found-car-officer-involved-shooting/100692974/ [https://perma.cc/ 
6TCY-APWU] (reporting passenger who reached for a gun was shot by officer during traffic stop); 
Arlington Police Officer Fatally Shoots Driver During Traffic Stop, NBCDFW CHANNEL 5 NEWS  
(Sept. 1, 2018), https://www.nbcdfw.com/news/local/arlington-traffic-stop-ends-in-shooting-pol 
ice/268141/ [https://perma.cc/V68N-VT42] (reporting an officer shot and killed driver of vehicle 
who rolled up window on officer’s arm and started to drive away during traffic stop);  
J. Weston Phippen, Jury Acquits Officer Who Shot Philando Castile, ATLANTIC (June 16, 2017), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/news/archive/2017/06/jury-acquits-philando-castile/530709/ 
[https://perma.cc/RA5G-SCLE] (reporting an officer claimed suspect reached for a gun during traffic 
stop). 
152. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 9.51(a). 
153. Id. § 9.51(c). 
154. Id. § 9.31(a). 
155. Id. § 9.32(a). 
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person is present during this confrontation, the use of deadly force also may 
be based on Section 9.33156 (defense of a third person).  
Of course, the evidence adduced at trial will determine whether any, 
some, or all of these defenses are available to the officer.  But if any evidence 
supports any of these justifications, the jury must be instructed, upon 
request, that if it has even a reasonable doubt about the applicability of the 
justification then defendant must be acquitted.157  The legal standards for 
these justifications differ, notwithstanding the virtually universal use of the 
“magic words” that recur throughout Chapter 9, giving the jury even more 
ways with which to acquit the officer. 
A. Self-defense 
Like other penal code justifications, self-defense is divided into two parts: 
Section 9.31 (non-deadly force in defense of self),158 and Section 9.32 
(deadly force in defense of self).159  The first element of Section 9.32, is 
that the requirements of Section 9.31 be satisfied if deadly force is used.160 
Although satisfaction of Section 9.31 is a prerequisite to justification for 
the use of deadly force in self-defense, both sections contain the “magic 
words” that run throughout Chapter 9.161  Section 9.31 initially limits the 
use of non-deadly force to those situations in which the actor reasonably 
believes such force to be immediately necessary.162  The statute goes on to 
exclude the justification for the use of force: 
 
156. Id. § 9.33. 
157. See Posey v. State, 966 S.W.2d 57, 62 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (holding the trial court has 
no duty to instruct sua sponte on unrequested defensive issues); Bennett v. State, 235 S.W.3d 241, 243 
(Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (holding the trial court did not err in failing to instruct on defense of third 
person where instruction was not requested); Woodfox v. State, 742 S.W.2d 408, 409–10 (Tex. Crim. 
App. 1987) (holding jury instruction on any defensive theory raised by the evidence from any source, 
whether credible or not, must be given if requested); Brown v. State, 955 S.W.2d 276, 279 (Tex. Crim. 
App. 1997). 
158. See generally PENAL CODE § 9.31(a) (outlining the required elements of self-defense). 
159. See generally id. § 9.32(a) (outlining the required elements of using deadly force in self-
defense). 
160. Id. § 9.32(a)(1). 
161. See id. § 9.31(a) (“[A] person is justified in using force against another when and to the degree 
the actor reasonably believes the force is immediately necessary . . . .”) (emphasis added); id. § 9.32(a) (“A person 
is justified in using deadly force against another . . . when and to the degree the actor believes the deadly force is 
immediately necessary . . . .”) (emphasis added). 
162. Id. § 9.31(a). 
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1. “in response to verbal provocation alone;”163 
2. “to resist an arrest or search . . . being made by a peace  
officer . . . ;”164 
3. “if the actor consented to the exact force used or attempted by the 
other person;”165 
4. “if the actor provoked the . . . use or attempted use of unlawful 
force . . . ;”166 or 
5. if the actor confronts another concerning their “differences” while 
the individual is carrying or possessing a weapon in violation of 
sections 46.02 (Unlawful Carrying a Weapon) or 46.05 (Prohibited 
Weapons).167 
While any of these disqualifiers, other than the second one, might deprive 
a peace officer of access to self-defense, they do not usually do so.  It is 
more likely that the determination of self-defense will turn on whether the 
officer reasonably believed that the degree of force used was immediately 
necessary.  
1. “Immediately Necessary” and the Presumption Problem 
In 2007, Texas adopted language promoted by the National Rifle 
Association (NRA) modifying the self-defense law.168  Previously, Texas 
law required that the actor “retreat,” if it was reasonable to do so, before 
 
163. Id. § (b)(1). 
164. Id. § (b)(2). 
165. Id. § (b)(3). 
166. Id. § (b)(4).  An actor who provokes an encounter may revive his right to self-defense by 
abandoning the encounter or “clearly communicat[ing] to the other his intent to do so” if he reasonably 
believes he cannot abandon the encounter safely.  Id. § (b)(4)(A). 
167. Id. § (b)(5). 
168. See Lianne Hart, Texas May OK Shooting First in Self-Defense, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 18, 2007, 12:00 
AM.), https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2007-feb-18-na-guns18-story.html [https://perma. 
cc/E729-PSQE] (highlighting the National Rifle Association’s supports adoption of “stand your 
ground” laws throughout the United States, including Texas); Alain Stephens, Four Things You Should 
Know About Self-Defense Law in Texas, HOUS. PUB. MEDIA (July 9, 2018), https://www.houston 
publicmedia.org/articles/news/2018/07/09/294925/four-things-you-should-know-about-self-defen 
se-law-in-texas/ [https://perma.cc/V39U-QFDD] (discussing the 2007 amendment of the Texas self-
defense law removing the retreat requirement altogether); Michael B. Charlton, Texas Criminal Law, in 
6 TEX. PRAC. SERIES, at § 7.05 (2020) (describing the elimination of the duty to retreat by the Texas 
Legislature in 2007). 
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deadly force could be used if it was reasonable to retreat.169  The retreat 
requirement was eliminated, and as part of that legislative package a 
presumption was inserted into both the non-deadly and deadly force 
justifications for self-defense.170  This presumption is peculiar and perhaps 
unique in Texas law.  Unlike other presumptions found in statutes and the 
common law of Texas, it runs in favor of the defendant.171  Other 
presumptions favor the prosecution.172 
Because the “immediately necessary” presumption is a defensive device, 
it cannot be faulted, as other presumptions can, for violating due process by 
shifting or lessening the State’s burden of persuasion.173  Consequently, it 
is virtually immune from attack by the prosecution, although a defendant 
may complain that the trial judge failed to properly instruct the jury on the 
presumption,174 thereby potentially diminishing its beneficial effect.  
To better understand just how defendant-friendly this presumption is, 
consider how it is to be applied.  Unlike presumptions favoring the 
prosecution, the presumption must be submitted to the jury if the facts 
 
169. See Hart, supra note 168 (highlighting the National Rifle Association’s supports adoption 
of “stand your ground” laws throughout the United States, including Texas); Stephens, supra note 168 
(discussing the 2007 amendment of the Texas self-defense law removing the retreat requirement 
altogether); Charlton, supra note 168, at § 7.05 (describing the elimination of the duty to retreat by the 
Texas Legislature in 2007).  More on the “retreat rule” can be found infra in the subsection discussing 
the use of deadly force in self-defense. 
170. See generally TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 9.31(a) (incorporating the presumption of 
reasonableness for the actor’s belief that the force was immediately necessary); id. § 9.32(b) 
(incorporating the presumption of reasonableness for the actor’s belief that deadly force was 
immediately necessary). 
171. The presumption goes to the “actor’s belief that the force was immediately necessary,” an 
element that, if raised by the evidence, must be disproven by the prosecution beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  Id. § 9.31(a); see id. § 9.32(b) (outlining when the “actor’s belief . . . that the deadly force was 
immediately necessary” is presumed reasonable). 
172. See id. § 22.05(c) (stating prosecution-friendly presumption of recklessness and danger 
when a defendant points a firearm toward another); id. § 31.03(c)(3)(A)–(C) (asserting prosecution-
friendly presumption of knowledge that property is stolen if pawn shop owner fails to keep certain 
records). 
173. See generally REAMEY, supra note 36, at 360–63 (stating that where a “presumption may not 
be rebutted . . . it . . . violates a defendant’s right to due process by lowering the burden of proof 
required by the State”); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975) (asserting a presumption that lessens 
the prosecution’s burden of proof as to an element of the crime is unconstitutional). 
174. See Villarreal v. State, 393 S.W.3d 867, 875 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2012) (holding the 
trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on presumption of reasonableness in self-defense case), 
rev’d on other grounds, 453 S.W.3d 429 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015) (holding the harm in failing to instruct the 
jury was not egregious). 
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giving rise to it are supported by sufficient evidence.175  And the jury must 
be instructed that it is required to find the presumed facts—i.e., that it was 
reasonable to believe the force was “immediately necessary”—unless the 
prosecution can prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the facts giving rise to the 
presumption do not exist.176  
This procedural use of the self-defense presumption would be 
unconstitutional if the inferential device ran in favor of the prosecution.177  
By requiring the jury to find the presumed fact, that the use of force was 
immediately necessary, the statute makes the presumption irrebuttable, or at 
least shifts the burden of persuasion.  It relieves the defendant from one of 
the “elements” of self-defense: the reasonableness of the belief that force 
was immediately necessary.  This can be done because it does not violate the 
defendant’s due process right to proof beyond a reasonable doubt, but 
rather disadvantages the State by increasing the likelihood that the jury will 
find that the defendant acted in self-defense. 
It seems likely that this provision and the elimination of the “retreat” 
requirement were intended to further protect the citizen or homeowner 
from conviction for using force against an intruder or other person bent on 
committing one of the several serious offenses that activate the 
presumption.  It seems much less likely that these relaxed rules for self-
defense were meant to benefit errant police officers using excessive force.  
But that is exactly what they do. 
The net effect of the alterations to the self-defense justification is to 
lessen the need for the person using force to “calculate” whether that force 
 
175. See Villarreal, 393 S.W.3d at 874 (asserting a defendant is entitled to instruction on 
presumption of reasonableness if evidence from any source raises the issue, regardless of whether the 
evidence is credible or conflicts with or contradicts other evidence), rev’d on other grounds, 453 S.W.3d 
429 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015) (holding the harm in failing to instruct the jury was not egregious). 
176. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 2.05(b)(1) (“[I]f there is sufficient evidence of the facts that 
give rise to the presumption, the issue of the existence of the presumed fact must be submitted to the 
jury unless the court is satisfied that the evidence as a whole clearly precludes a finding beyond a 
reasonable doubt of the presumed fact.”). 
177. Requiring the jury to infer reasonableness, which is an element of self-defense, would make 
the presumption irrebuttable.  The presumption, therefore, would be regarded as conclusive and 
violative of due process.  See Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 522 (1979) (quoting Morissette v. 
United States, 342 U.S. 246, 274–75 (1952)) (asserting conclusive presumption interferes with the 
presumption of innocence); REAMEY, supra note 36, at 360–62 (“The permissive presumption does 
not require the jury to find the presumed fact but only permits such a finding and does not, therefore, 
shift the burden of production or persuasion to the defendant.”). 
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is needed immediately, or whether a lesser degree of force would suffice.178  
In doing this, Texas self-defense law encourages the use of greater force and 
encourages the use of that force sooner than might be necessary. 
To illustrate the practical effect this change has on the application of self-
defense, reconsider the hypothetical situation posed earlier.  Suppose that a 
police officer, or anyone else, is being approached and threatened by a knife-
wielding person thirty yards away from the officer.  The “magic words” 
formulation denies the officer the right to shoot the would-be assailant until 
the danger is imminent.  Conversely, the presumption would require the jury 
to find the officer’s belief that deadly force was immediately necessary to be 
reasonable because the attacker was attempting to commit murder, even if 
the attacker was still too far from the officer to be a realistic threat.  Viewing 
self-defense in this way places no value on the life of the person attempting 
or committing one of the specified offenses and places all value on the life 
of the person who is being threatened, even if that life is not presently in 
jeopardy. 
This rationale directly contradicts the reasoning of Tennessee v. Garner.  
While it is true that the need to apprehend a fleeing felon is less than the 
need to defend innocent life, the degree to which force is necessary to 
defend oneself varies according to all of the circumstances in play when the 
force is employed.  It is always preferable to spare the life of one who is 
committing a violent crime, but it is not always possible to do so.  Logic 
dictates that, as the “magic words” in Texas law suggest, no force should be 
used until it is necessary, and even then, no more than the least amount of 
force that will be effective should be used.  To the extent that the 
“immediately necessary” presumption in sections 9.31 and 9.32 extends the 
self-defense justification to virtually any use of force against a person 
committing certain violent crimes, the law categorically permits the use of 
deadly force without consulting the necessity inherent in the situation.179  
And the determination of whether one of those crimes is being committed 
is left to the person acting in self-defense, not to a judge or jury. 
 
178. See Denise M. Drake, The Castle Doctrine: An Expanding Right to Stand Your Ground, 
39 ST. MARY’S L.J. 573, 599–600 (2008) (comparing justifications that self-defense decisions must be 
made in a split-second without time for reflection versus taking the time to fully examine the situation). 
179. Cf. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11 (1985) (“The use of deadly force to prevent the 
escape of all felony suspects, whatever the circumstances, is constitutionally unreasonable.”). 
33
Reamey: Police Use of Force Laws in Texas
Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2021
  
134 ST. MARY’S LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 52:101 
2. Deadly Force in Self-defense 
Much of what applies to self-defense deadly force use originates in non-
deadly use of force.  Because section 9.31 is a prerequisite to the justification 
created by section 9.32,180 certain basic principles of self-defense form a 
kind of foundation for the use of any level of force.181  There are, however, 
additional principles unique to the use of deadly force in defense of self. 
One of these principles, adopted as part of the 2007 modifications to the 
law of self-defense, is that a person or officer need not “retreat” before using 
deadly force.182  The logic behind the retreat requirement previously found 
in Texas law is that life should be spared whenever possible.183  
Alternatively, to borrow a phrase from Monty Python, it is better to “run 
away”184 than to stubbornly refuse to give ground until the use of deadly 
force becomes necessary.  
The absence of a retreat requirement allows a person to “stand his 
ground” rather than requiring that they avoid a deadly confrontation.185  
Moreover, a jury “may not consider whether the actor failed to retreat” if 
the actor did not provoke the difficulty and was not engaged in criminal 
activity at the time deadly force was used.186 
What is the consequence of this face-saving “stand your ground” 
position?  The hypothetical police officer who faces someone coming 
toward her or him with a knife need not move back in an attempt to 
maintain a safe distance and avoid the use of deadly force.  Instead, the 
 
180. PENAL CODE § 9.32(a)(1). 
181. See id. § 9.31(b) (prohibiting self-defense in response to verbal provocation; to resist arrest 
or search being made by a person known to be a peace officer; or if the actor consented to the force 
used against him or her). 
182. Id. § 9.32(c).  A bill introduced in the 87th Regular Session of the Texas Legislature would 
have modified section 9.32 to reinstate the retreat requirement.  See H.B. 196, 87th Leg., R.S. § 1 (2021) 
(proposing the amendment of section 9.32 of the Texas Penal Code to require retreat when safe). 
The bill died in committee. 
183. See Catherine L. Carpenter, Of the Enemy Within, The Castle Doctrine, and Self-Defense, 
86 MARQ. L. REV. 653, 656 (2003) (citations omitted) (“Proponents of the duty to retreat . . . argue 
that it is the supreme value of life that demands flight of those who are unlawfully attacked.  What may 
appear to be cowardice in the face of aggression is actually the imposition of a legal requirement 
intended to calm the fires and prevent the loss of life.”). 
184. MONTY PYTHON AND THE HOLY GRAIL (Python (Monty) Pictures Limited 1975). 
185. See PENAL CODE § 9.32(c) (stating Texas does not require retreat even where is might be 
reasonable to do so); Charlton, supra note 168, at § 7.05 (noting the abolishment of the duty to retreat 
in Texas in 2007). 
186. PENAL CODE § 9.32(d). 
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officer can hold her position until shooting becomes “immediately 
necessary.” 
Removal of the retreat requirement, combined with the presumption of 
reasonable belief in necessity, has the net effect of readily justifying the 
unnecessary use of deadly force in self-defense.  Not only does the officer 
not need to postpone using deadly force, but the officer also does not need 
to avoid using that force before it is required.  
In addition to allowing an officer to defend himself or herself, Texas law 
permits the use of deadly force to prevent the “imminent commission of 
aggravated kidnapping, murder, sexual assault, aggravated sexual assault, 
robbery, or aggravated robbery.”187  Although all of these felonies involve 
the use or threatened use of force, and often deadly force, only murder 
necessarily includes death.188  In order to prevent the imminent death of 
another, an officer need not rely on the self-defense provision in 
Section 9.32 but may instead be justified in using deadly force in defense of 
a third person, a justification created in Section 9.33 of the penal code.189 
As serious as the enumerated felonies in Section 9.32 are, none—save 
murder—necessarily involves the loss of life.  Nevertheless, Texas law 
grants an officer a defense to prosecution for taking a life to prevent the 
commission of one of these offenses.190  The “magic words” limitation 
applies but is subject to the necessity presumption,191 effectively making 
the defense more readily available to the officer.  It is noteworthy that none 
of these crimes carries the death penalty, even if the actor is convicted by 
judge and jury.192 
If an officer provokes the confrontation that escalates to the need to act 
in self-defense, the justification is denied.193  This limitation, applied 
 
187. Id. § 9.32(a)(2)(B). 
188. Compare id. § 20.04 (describing the offense of aggravated kidnapping which does not 
require death), with id. § 22.011 (describing the offense of sexual assault which does not require death), 
and id. § 22.021 (describing the offense of aggravated sexual assault which does not require death), and 
id. § 29.02 (describing the offense of robbery which does not require death), and id. § 29.03 (describing 
the offense of aggravated robbery which does not require death), with id. § 19.02 (describing the offense 
of murder which requires death). 
189. See generally id. § 9.33.  Defense of a third person is discussed in more detail in the next 
subsection. 
190. Id. § 9.32(a)(2)(B). 
191. See id. § 9.32(b) (stating the situations that lead to a presumption of immediate necessity). 
192. Capital murder is the only offense in Texas punishable by death.  Murder, in its basic form, 
is not a capital crime.  Capital murder convictions often do not result in the death penalty, but may be 
punished by life imprisonment without parole.  See id. § 12.31(a). 
193. Id. § 9.31(b)(4). 
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rigorously, might deny an officer access to self-defense in an appropriate 
case.  Because provocation is not defined, however, this potential 
disqualifier rarely seems to have that effect. 
3. Using Deadly and Non-deadly Force to Defend Others 
The self-defense provision—inaptly named when force is used in defense 
of another—sometimes applies to prevent the commission of listed 
offenses.194  In preventing at least one of those offenses—murder—deadly 
force used to prevent the offense may also protect the intended victim.  
Defense of third persons is more generally available to protect actors than 
the crime prevention variation of self-defense.  Defense of third persons 
also may permit the use of deadly force.195 
Laws creating justifications for the defense of third persons usually fall 
within one of two categories: (1) “alter-ego” defenses, and (2) “reasonable 
belief” defenses.196  Traditionally, one who came to the aid of another 
enjoyed whatever justification for using force (or deadly force) that the 
person being aided would have enjoyed.197  In other words, the aider 
stepped into the shoes of the person being aided.  If that victim could have 
used deadly force in self-defense to ward off the attacker, the person coming 
to the supposed victim’s aid also would be justified in using deadly force.198 
The obvious problem with this approach is that the person who acts in 
good faith to defend someone appearing to be victimized by an attacker 
might misperceive the aided person’s status.  One acting with the best 
intentions might easily and inadvertently assist the person who initiated the 
assault, robbery, or attempted sexual offense.  Since the Good Samaritan 
“stepped into the shoes” of the person she was aiding, the aider could have 
no more or less justification than the supposed victim.199  If that “victim” 
actually had no justification to use any degree of force, the person offering 
assistance, whatever her beliefs or intentions, also would not be justified in 
using force.200  Needless to say, this formulation of third-party defense law 
 
194. PENAL CODE § 9.32(a)(2)(B). 
195. Id. § 9.33. 
196. See generally 40 C.J.S. Homicide § 166 (2021) (describing the circumstances and requirements 
of the defense of defense of another); REAMEY, supra note 36, at 272–73 (describing the defenses of 
third persons under reasonable belief). 
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strongly discouraged persons from aiding others without being certain of 
the factual circumstances and the law surrounding the encounter. 
The alternative, adopted by Texas as part of its incorporation of the 
Model Penal Code, focuses instead on the reasonableness of the belief of 
the person offering aid that the person being assisted was in the legal right, 
and the person against whom force was offered (the apparent attacker) was 
not justified.201  Because the justification for aiding a third-party turns on 
reasonable belief, the aider who misperceives the situation, but does so 
reasonably, remains justified notwithstanding the actual legal status of the 
“attacker” and “victim.”202 
This arrangement is embodied in Section 9.33 of the Texas Penal 
Code.203  The key language of that provision provides that the justification 
turns on “the circumstances as the actor reasonably believes them to be.”204  
If those circumstances would justify an officer to use force in aid of another, 
and if that force is immediately necessary, the officer may use the degree of 
force in aid that she would be entitled to use under Section 9.31 (non-deadly 
force in self-defense) or 9.32 (deadly force in self-defense).205  So, an officer 
in Texas may use deadly force in self-defense, to prevent the imminent 
commission of certain enumerated felonies, and to protect third parties the 
officer reasonably believes would be entitled to use that degree of force to 
protect themselves.206 
4. Other Force Provisions in Chapter 9 
Other justifications in Chapter 9 have occasional applicability when peace 
officers use force, or even deadly force.  One of these is a rather peculiar 
statute permitting the use of deadly force to preserve another’s life “in an 




203. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 9.33(1) (“A person is justified in using force or deadly force 
against another to protect a third person if under the circumstances as the actor reasonably believes 
them to be, the actor would be justified under Section 9.31 or 9.32 in using force or deadly force to 
protect himself against the unlawful force or unlawful deadly force he reasonably believes to be 
threatening the third person he seeks to protect.”). 
204. Id. 
205. Id. 
206. Note that the necessity presumption does not apply directly to Section 9.33, although it is 
part of both Section 9.31 and 9.32.  Also noteworthy is the inapplicability of any retreat requirement 
before using force in aid of a third party.  For logical reasons, this was true even before the retreat rule 
was removed from Texas law in 2007.  Hughes v. State, 719 S.W.2d 560, 564 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986). 
207. PENAL CODE § 9.34(b). 
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for killing a person to preserve that person’s life, but that clearly is not the 
case.  An officer, or a civilian actor, may use deadly force—force that does 
not necessarily cause death, despite its name—to save another.  Consider 
the action of an officer who finds an accident victim pinned to a train track 
with an engine fast approaching, or a driver whose arm is trapped in a 
horrific traffic accident and cannot escape a burning vehicle.  The officer 
might need to use “deadly force” in order to free the victim and “preserve 
the other’s life” in these situations. That officer would be justified in doing 
so by Section 9.34 of the Texas Penal Code.208 
Unlike most states, Texas grants possessors of property the right to use 
force or, in some cases, deadly force to protect that property.209  Unless 
they are themselves the possessors, peace officers do not share those 
justifications.  They do, however, have the same right as civilians to use force 
or deadly force to protect land or tangible property of another in limited 
circumstances.210  To access this justification, the officer would have to 
have been justified in using the degree of force to protect the property that 
would have been justified if it had been his property,211 and the unlawful 
property interference must have constituted attempted or consummated 
theft or criminal mischief to the third person’s property.212  
An officer might also use force or deadly force to protect another’s 
property if the officer has been asked to protect it or if the officer has a legal 
duty to do so.213  The legal duty option is problematic since Texas peace 
officers operate under very few legal duties regarding property 
protection.214  The Texas Property Code does create a duty for a peace 
officer to “accompany and assist” a property owner in executing a forcible 
entry and detainer order.215  In that specific circumstances, a peace officer 
is authorized to “use reasonable force in providing assistance,”216 but the 
statute does not elaborate on the degree of force that may be used, or 
 
208. Id.; REAMEY, supra note 36, at 273. 
209. PENAL CODE §§ 9.41–.42. 
210. Id. § 9.43. 
211. Id.  In other words, the officer would have to be justified under sections 9.41 and 9.42 
before she could resort to the justification for protection of another’s property.  Since only the 
possessor of the property is entitled to claim the justification of those sections, for purposes of defense 
of a third party’s property, the officer stands in the shoes of the property possessor.  Id. 
212. Id. § 9.43(1). 
213. Id. § 9.43(2)(A)–(B). 
214. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 2.13 (discussing general duties of peace officers). 
215. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 24A.003(a) (West 2019). 
216. Id. § 24A.003(d). 
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whether that force is meant to be used against the person in possession of 
the property or in forcibly entering the property, or both.  
To make clear—or to make as clear as possible—how these property 
provisions apply to the use of force, consider an officer who sees a 
suspected burglar exiting a home or building and carrying off what appears 
to be stolen property.  Suppose the officer uses deadly force to keep the 
burglar from carrying away the stolen goods.  In that case, the officer might 
claim a justification for using that force to protect the property of another 
(i.e., it might be reasonable to believe the force is immediately necessary to 
protect the property from what is reasonably believed to be theft),217 but 
not to apprehend or arrest the fleeing felon.218  Tennessee v. Garner 219 and 
Section 9.51 of the Texas Penal Code220 (use of force to effect an arrest) 
would not allow deadly force to be used to arrest or seize the suspect; 
indeed, it would be unconstitutional for the officer to use such force in that 
circumstance.221  Protection of a third person’s property, on the other hand, 
does permit the use of deadly force, and that justification is not limited in 
application to peace officers.222  It would not be correct, however, to 
interpret Section 9.51 as always allowing deadly force to be used to protect 
property of another.  In fact, the restrictions on the use of deadly force in 
defense of property, whether the property is one’s own or that of another, 
are quite limiting.  They include the “magic words” found in self-defense 
provisions223 as well as other “reasonable” beliefs224 that, taken together, 
make the justification unavailable in most situations.  That Texas allows 
deadly force to be used to protect property at all is quite remarkable.  But it 
would be misleading to say without elaboration or qualification that Texas 
law allows deadly force to be used to protect property. 
 
217. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 9.43(1). 
218. Id. § 9.51(c). 
219. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985). 
220. PENAL CODE § 9.51(c). 
221. Garner, 471 U.S. at 11–12 (“The use of deadly force to prevent the escape of all felony 
suspects, whatever the circumstances, is constitutionally unreasonable.”). 
222. PENAL CODE § 9.43. 
223. Id. §§ 9.41(a), 9.42(2); see id. § 9.43 (requiring compliance with Section 9.41 or 9.42 as a 
prerequisite to its application). 
224. See id. § 9.43 (requiring compliance with Section 9.41 or 9.42 as a prerequisite to its 
application). 
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IV.    COHESIVE, COHERENT, COMPREHENSIBLE, AND CONSISTENT 
It is evident that Texas use-of-force law suffers from a lack of coherency.  
Unavoidable as it may be, it sows confusion to simultaneously treat peace 
officers as requiring special rules on the use of force and, at the same time, 
to allow them to access the justifications available to every other person who 
uses force, particularly when the justifications designed for civilian use are 
not well suited for trained professionals. 
Peace officers are different.  Their duties of arrest and search sometimes, 
but not always, require a degree of force.  It is desirable, as reflected in the 
ALI’s Principles of the Law: Policing project, to limit the use of force to the 
minimal amount necessary to achieve legitimate policing goals.225  Texas 
law confusingly adopts this limitation in one statute,226 only to contradict it 
in another.227  While it may seem the “magic words” used throughout 
Chapter 9 of the Texas Penal Code go a long way toward producing a 
requirement that minimal force be used, the effect of the “magic words” 
phrasing has been diluted, at least in the self-defense provisions, by the 
abandonment of the retreat requirement and the introduction of a 
presumption that greatly broadens the self-defense justification for some 
felonies.228 
How, then, might these contradictions be resolved so Texas peace 
officers are guided by a standard that is reasonable and usable?  Reform of 
the use-of-force laws applicable to police must reflect an understanding that 
three sets of needs must be in balance: (1) the security needs of officers; 
(2) the security needs of civilians; and (3) the operational needs of law 
enforcement.   
  
 
225. POLICING, supra note 92, at § 5.03. 
226. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 15.24 (providing no greater force than necessary may be 
used to arrest). 
227. See PENAL CODE § 9.51 (stating force may be used to arrest “when and to the degree” the 
officer reasonably believes it to be immediately necessary). 
228. See id. §§ 9.32(a)(2)(B), 9.32(b)(1)(C). 
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These sometimes competing interests might be thought of as legs of a 













Any legislative scheme intended to strike an appropriate balance between 
these three needs must seek to account for the constituencies they represent 
and the value each set of needs contributes to the whole.  For example, 
police officers must enjoy a measure of protection from unjust prosecution 
and conviction when they use force in self-defense.  At the same time, the 
civilian population likely to be on the receiving-end of this application of 
force must be protected by laws that restrain officers from using unlimited 
or excessive force.  And society must enjoy the security of effective law 
enforcement who can and will employ necessary and sufficient means to 
ensure community safety and well-being. 
The contradictory and confusing mix of Texas laws governing the use of 
force by law enforcement ill-serves all three of these interests.  Police 
officers (and civilians) are over-protected by expansive self-defense 
justifications.  At the same time, due to legal contradictions and 
complexities, officers often suffer from an inability to readily discern 
whether, and to what extent, force may be used against others in carrying 
out legitimate policing functions like arrest.  Civilians are typically the 
victims of this uncertainty, especially when officers wrongly conclude more 
force may be used than the law actually allows.229  And when too much or 
 
229. This “better safe than sorry” approach to the use of force is reflected in the frequently 
repeated aphorism that it’s “better to be judged by twelve than carried by six.”  The rarity of 
prosecutions and the likelihood of acquittal in those few cases brought to trial against an officer may 
lead officers to conclude that the odds favor the use of overwhelming force regardless of the limits 
imposed by law.  This effect is enhanced by fear and an imperfect understanding of the policies and 
laws regulating use of force. 
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too little force is applied in a given situation, operational success suffers, 
usually to the detriment of the community being policed, as well as to the 
reputation and effectiveness of policing agencies.  
The laws governing the use of force by officers must be considered 
together, and not separately, in order to better balance the needs of all law 
enforcement constituencies and interests in Texas.  From an officer’s 
perspective, the most pressing need is to create a cohesive, coherent, 
comprehensible, and consistent body of law.  Hortatory statements in 
statutes regarding the use of force that suggest a standard differing from 
other statutory language must be removed unless that language is entirely 
consistent with, and serves to reinforce, statutes that create justifications for 
the use of force.  Article 15.24 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, 
for example, simply cannot coexist with Section 9.51 of the Texas Penal 
Code.230  
If the standard for self-defense by officers is to differ from that governing 
self-defense by civilians, presumably by being less forgiving for officers, that 
difference must be explicit.  Better yet, the self-defense standards for 
officers and civilians should remain the same, but should be reconsidered 
with an appreciation that it is often officers who will rely on them.  The 
loosening of the threshold for self-defense that occurred in 2007 was no 
doubt intended to protect homeowners, business owners, and other 
potential victims of crime from prosecution for using force that probably 
was not necessary, or for using force that was excessive in degree.  As well-
intended as this change may have been, it has had the perverse effect of 
allowing peace officers to claim a justification in situations that many people 
would consider unjustifiable.  That judgment by reasonable people, perhaps 
reasonable people serving as a jury, is made for them by a law that allows 
officers to shoot before it is necessary, and to shoot rather than explore less 
deadly alternatives. 
This expansive version of self-defense inhibits prosecuting officers in 
circumstances that will sometimes be seen by the public as undeserving of 
leniency.  The reality is law enforcement officers and civilian members of 
 
230. Compare TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 15.24 (“In making an arrest, all reasonable means 
are permitted to be used to effect it. No greater force, however, shall be resorted to than is necessary to 
secure the arrest and detention of the accused.”) (emphasis added), with TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. 
§ 9.51(a) (“A peace officer, or a person acting in a peace officer’s presence and at his direction, is 
justified in using force against another when and to the degree the actor reasonably believes the force is 
immediately necessary to make or assist in making an arrest or search, or to prevent or assist in 
preventing escape after arrest . . . .”) (emphasis added).  
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the public differ in terms of training, proficiency with weapons, and their 
ability to deal with stressful and confrontational situations.  This difference 
could be addressed by establishing two sets of standards for self-defense, 
one of which retains the current standard for civilians and one of which 
makes self-defense somewhat less accessible for trained officers acting in 
the line of duty.  Far better, however, would be a return to a uniform 
standard that discourages the premature use of force no matter the 
circumstance and better protects the sanctity of life to which the Supreme 
Court alluded in Tennessee v. Garner.231 
The use of force to prevent an escape from custody also must be revised.  
In its current form, Section 9.52 is largely unconstitutional.  In order to 
establish a uniform standard, treating escape from custody (Section 9.52) in 
the same way as “escape after arrest” (Section 9.51) would provide an 
appropriate curb on the use of force while explicitly addressing an 
operational need.  
Using deadly force to protect or recover property seems per se excessive, 
although Texas law continues to allow a justification in certain 
circumstances.232  Setting aside whether this use of deadly force is ever 
appropriate, it should be clear it is always inappropriate for a peace officer 
to use deadly force to protect or recover the property of another, something 
that is now allowed by Texas Penal Code Section 9.43.233 
Justifications for essential policing functions—arrest and search—must 
continue to be limited by state law.  While Section 9.51 of the penal code 
currently does this by use of the reasonableness standard coupled with the 
“magic words” formulation found throughout the Code, consideration 
should be given to adoption of a minimum-force limitation.  Although the 
difference between what is minimally necessary and what is reasonable may 
be slight, the minimum-force formulation expresses in a more easily 
understood manner the goal that should animate all decisions about the use 
of force. 
Texas law has long curtailed the use of deadly force in making an 
arrest,234 but any reform that encompasses police use of force must address 
 
231. See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 21 (1985) (“While we agree that burglary is a serious 
crime, we cannot agree that it is so dangerous as automatically to justify the use of deadly force.”). 
232. See PENAL CODE § 9.42; see id. § 9.42(2) (potentially, while limited in its reach, extending 
to prevention of the commission of minor misdemeanors, like criminal mischief in the nighttime and 
theft in the nighttime). 
233. Id. § 9.43. 
234. Id. § 9.51(c). 
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whether, and under what circumstances, deadly force may be used to 
apprehend persons suspected of committing criminal acts.  The existing 
provision, Section 9.51(c),235 appears to satisfy the standards of Tennessee v. 
Garner, but it nevertheless may allow deadly force in circumstances that 
endanger innocent civilians and do little to achieve security for the 
community.236 
Law enforcement agencies are free, of course, to set higher standards for 
the use of force.  They might allow no more than the minimum force 
absolutely necessary under the circumstances, or they might restrict the use 
of deadly force to self-defense and the defense of others.  But these local 
regulations ultimately will affect only an officer’s employment.  They will 
not provide a basis for prosecution.  
If prosecution of errant officers is ever to be a feasible alternative, one 
that is seen as a real option and one that acts as a real deterrent to excessive 
force, Texas’s use of force laws must be revamped and adjusted to provide 
an optimal balance between sometimes competing needs.  Those laws must 
address the needs of officers to be safe, the needs of the community to be 
free from excessive force, and the needs of society to enjoy the security and 




236. See Garner, 471 U.S. at 10–13 (discussing the reasonableness standard for use of deadly 
force).  Not all those who have committed crimes need to be caught immediately.  High-speed chases 
on crowded streets and highways and firing shots in densely populated urban areas carry risks that far 
outstrip the benefits of apprehending most criminals, even those who have committed felonies.  Given 
the proliferation of acts denominated by legislatures as criminal, arrests often involve victimless or 
non-violent crimes. 
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